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Abstract
Many people today have an iPhone, iPad or iPod. Not many would realize
that valuable information is stored on these devices. When a crime occurs, an iOS
Device could hold key information to help solve said crime that criminals are not
aware are present on the device. This can include GPS information as well as
application history on the device itself.
The project I wish to do and complete is to create a class where students
can learn the about iOS Forensics. Student will be able to learn the basics of an
iDevice, as well as how to work with forensics tools to acquire the information in
an efficient manner. The class will also introduce forensic tools that can be used
with iOS Devices. These tools can include Open Source and Commercial
forensic tools. This class will be offered to both Graduates and Undergraduates
at Governors State University. It will act as a beginner’s class, for individuals
who want to learn more and have an interest in iOS Forensics.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
IOS devices are becoming a bigger part of everyday life. Many people in
the world have an iPhone, iPod or iPad. These devices can hold a wealth of
information. This information can include contacts, pictures, Short Message
Service (SMS) messages and much more. Many users may believe that once
something is deleted off the device, it is gone forever. Just like in computer
forensics, deleting an item does not mean that it is gone from the device. The
item can be retrieved from the device. This can be important for evidence that can
be held on the device and can be used in investigations if the opportunity is
provided.
Like any field in digital forensics, there are certain procedures and
strategies that need to be known to extract the data in a safe and efficient manner.
A person cannot just go into a computer and break their way into it to gain the
information an investigator would need. This is the same for iOS devices. It is
important for individuals to know the correct ways to access this data on the
device.
This report will discuss the class that was created for Governors State
University, which is called iOS Device Forensics. This class will give an
introduction to iOS Forensics for individuals that are interested in this subject.
For the book chosen for this class was Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka’s book
iPhone and iOS Forensics: Investigation, Analysis and Mobile Security for Apple
iPhone, iPad, and iOS Devices. The following chapters in this report will express

2

what will be covered in each section or chapter, as well as what was learned in
each section.

3

Chapter 2 – Methods
The materials used to find the information for the class was primarily the
apple development library 1, Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka’s book iPhone
and iOS Forensics: Investigation, Analysis and Mobile Security for Apple iPhone,
iPad, and iOS Devices and information that was provided through discussion with
Dan O’Day. Some informative websites were also found for additional
information. All materials are included in the bibliography at the end of this
report.
From the information that was provided or found, PowerPoint
presentations were prepared for eleven weeks. These presentations then cover
material that would be in that week’s class. The students that participate in the
class will also become familiar with the tool iPhone Analyzer, which can be found
at crypticbit.com.
The class will also include a final project, will have students doing a hands
on project. The students will be able use what they have learned to retrieve data
from a device or backup. This project will take up the last three weeks in the
semester. Once finished with the project, students will then be able to present
their work for other classmates.

Undergraduate vs Graduate
It should be understood that there will be an undergraduate section and a
graduate section for the class. The graduates that will be in this class will have to

1

(Apple)
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complete a paper as part of their grade. The paper has a few options that the
student can choose from. One of these choices is the student will chose a tool in
iOS device forensics to research on. They will give details on where the tool was
found, what the tool is able to do and how the tool is unique. Another topic that
the student may choose is to pick a feature on the new iOS 8 and explain the pros
and cons for it. Students will explore the feature and give insight on how this
feature could be of use in a digital forensics investigation.

Chapter 3 – Week One: Introduction to iOS Forensics
This is the first week of class for the students. This is the time that the
students will be able to go over the syllabus and ask any questions that they would
have. This week will also touch on why these devices are important. As stated
before, these devices have the capability to store valuable information that could
be of use in investigations.
Students will also be able to learn about the different iOS versions that
have been offered up to the point of today’s current version of iOS, which is iOS
8. Students will also learn about the different models for iPods, iPads and
iPhones. Forensic artifacts, which are known as something that would be of
interest, are discussed along with the difference between Logical 2 and Physical 3
Acquisitions. The difference between technical analysis and ‘Forensic’
examination is.

2
3

Copying the active file system from a device into another file.
A physically bit-by-bit copy of the file system that is created.
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A technical analysis is used to authenticate data through explanation of the
technical features of the data. A ‘Forensic’ Examination attempts to understand
the evidence that is found from the acquisition. In simpler terms, the analysis
explains how to get the evidence whereas an examination determines whether or
not a conclusion of guilty or not guilty.

PowerPoint Presentation for Week One
Slide 1
iOS Device Forensics
Introduction to iOS Forensics
Week 1

Slide 2

Syllabus


Syllabus can be found on blackboard.



Other readings can also be found on
blackboard.

◦ We will be going over the syllabus in class.

Slide 3
Importance of iOS Devices
•
•

•

Why do you think iDevices are important?
Many people store personal data on their
iDevices, including email, contacts, messages,
photographs and videos.
A criminal could store valuable evidence on their
device. A few examples of this would be:

• GPS data
• Photographs from a scene

6

Slide 4
Prevalence of iOS
According to the wall street journal article by
Rani Molla, Apple has already sold 130 million
iPhone in Quarter 3 filings.

•

• http://blogs.wsj.com/numbers/is-iphone-6apples-most-popular-model-lets-ask-google1755/?mod=WSJBlog
These numbers do not include iPads or iPods!!

•

Slide 5
iOS Versions
•

iOS 1.x

•
•
•
•
•

Came with the first iPhone
Release in 2008
Originally named iPhone OS, but was changed
to iOS in 2010.
Last update was 1.1.5 back in 2008.

iOS 2.0

•
•
•
•

Released in 2008 with the iPhone 3G.
This version introduced the App Store.
Available for both iPhone and iPod Touch.
Last update was 2.2.1 back in 2009

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_iOS#iPhone_OS_1.x

Slide 6
iOS Versions Continued
•

iOS 3.x

•
•
•
•

Released in 2009.
Supported iPhone (1st generation), iPhone 3G
& 3GS and iPod Touch (1st and 2nd generation).
Last update was 3.2.2 back in 2010.

iOS 4.x

•
•
•
•

Released in 2010.
First major iOS release that was available to
iPod touch users for free.
Supported iPhone 3G & 3GS, iPhone 4, and
iPod Touch (2nd & 3rd).
Last update was 4.3.5 back in 2011.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_iOS#iPhone_OS_1.x

Slide 7

iOS Versions Continued


iOS 5.x

◦ Released in 2011
◦ Supported iPhone 3GS, iPhone 4 & 4S, iPod Touch (3rd
and 4th Generation), iPad (1st generation) and iPad 2.
◦ Last update was 5.1.1 in 2012



iOS 6.x

◦ Released to the public in 2012.
◦ Supported iPhone 3GS, iPhone 4 & 4S, iPhone 5, iPod
Touch (4th and 5th generation), iPad 2, iPad (3rd and
4th Generation) and iPad Mini (1st generation).
◦ Last update was 6.1.6 on February 21, 2014

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_iOS#iPhone_OS_1.x
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Slide 8
iOS Versions Continued
•

iOS 7.x

• Released in 2013
• Supported iPhone 4 & 4S, iPhone 5, 5C &
5S, iPod Touch (5th Generation), iPad 2, iPad
(3rd & 4th generation) and iPad Mini (1st
generation).
• Final release was June 30, 2014.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_iOS#iPhone_OS_1.x

Slide 9
iOS Versions Continued
•

iOS 8.x

• Most recent version of iOS.
• Announced June 2, 2014.
• Will support iPhone 4S, iPhone 5C, 5S,
iPhone 6, iPhone 6 Plus, iPod Touch (5th
generation), iPad 2, iPad (3rd & 4th
generation), iPad Air, iPad Mini (1st & 2nd
generation)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_iOS#iPhone_OS_1.x

Slide 10

iPhone Models


These years are when the device was discontinued.
Final OS Version

Year

iPhone

3.1.3

2008

iPhone 3G

4.2.1

2010

iPhone 3GS

6.1.6

2012

iPhone 4

7.1.2

2013

iPhone 4S

-

2013

iPhone 5

-

2013

iPhone 5C

-

-

iPhone 5S

-

-

iPhone 6

-

-

iPhone 6 Plus

-

-

There are no final
OS versions for
iPhone 4S and
higher because
they can still
receive software
updates.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_iOS_devices

Slide 11

iPod Models
Final OS Version

8GB

16GB

32GB

1st Generation

3.1.3

2008

2008

2008

2nd Generation

4.2.1

2010

2009

2009

-

3rd Generation

5.1.1

2010

-

2010

2010

4th

6.1.6

2012

2013

2013

2012

-

-

-

-

-

Generation

5th Generation

64GB
-

Only the 5th Generation is still receiving updates

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_iOS_devices

8

Slide 12

iPad Models
Final OS
Version

16GB

32GB

64GB

128G

1st Generation

5.1.1

2011

2011

2011

-

2nd Generation

-

March
2014

2012

2012

-

3rd Generation

-

2012

2012

2012

-

4th Generation

-

-

-

-

-

iPad Air

-

-

-

-

-

iPad Mini (1st Generation)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

iPad Mini

(2nd

Generation)

Find more details about these devices here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_iOS_devices

Slide 13
Forensic Artifacts of Value
•

What is a forensic artifact?

Also known as a digital artifact, it is the device
that is being looked at.

•

•

•
•

i.e., Computer, email message, hard drive, iDevice

A Forensic Artifact would be something that
you would find of interest.

•

In the case of a crime, it would be an odd message
or incriminating photograph.

So what are some forensic artifacts of value in
iDevices?

GPS Data
Deleted Photographs
Deleted emails that are supicious

•
•
•

Slide 14
Logical vs Physical Acquisition
•

Logical Acquisition

Copying the active file system from the device
into another file.

•

•
•
•

•

Slide 15

Page 119, iPhone and iOS Forensics by Andrew
Hoog

1st technique often used by Analysts.
Some tool that use logical acquisitions will also
provide a reporting system.

Problem with the reporting system may be
that the examiner can view the data, but not
view the source. i.e., you can see the website,
but not the date and time it was visited.

Logical vs Physical Acquisitions


Physical
◦ This type of acquisition is similar to how a
hard drive is forensically imaged.
 A physical bit-by-bit copy of the file system is
created. This provides more data to be examined,
including deleted data. However, they are more
difficult to execute.



We will discuss Physical Acquisitions in
more detail in week 9.

9

Slide 16

Technical Analysis vs ‘Forensic’
Examination
•

Technical Analysis is used to authenticate data
through explanation of the technical features of
data and future usage.

• It is the way to explain how to get the
evidence
•

A ‘Forensic’ Examination attempts to understand
the evidence that is found from the acquisitions.

• It includes more then just the technical
data found through analysis. It is using the
evidence and understanding it to get a
conclusion.
•

i.e., guilty or not guilty.

Chapter 4 – Week Two: iDevice Hardware
In week two, students will become familiar with the hardware in an
iDevice. Most iPods, iPhones and iPads have a solid state drive. This drive is
called a NAND flash. What this drive does is it uses memory to store the data,
rather than having an actual drive in the device. The hardware section also
includes file systems that are stored on the device. Most iDevices will use a
HFS+ type file system. This is important to know because this is where the data
can be contained.
There is a folder 4 within the file system that is discussed that allows the
user to see the folders containing Application, Library and Media. The
Application folder contains the applications that are stored on the device. The
media folder contains all the pictures, videos and other media type data on the
device. The library may have the most useful data. This folder contains the
address book, calendar, favorites, mail, and messages.

4

/private/var2/mobile
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Students will learn about the disk partitioning scheme of an iDevice in this
week as well. The device has two partitions. The first partition contains the
firmware, where the second partition contains the data. Encryption is discussed,
from version iOS 3 to iOS 8. Students will also learn about the operating modes.
The modes include Normal, Recovery and DFU. The presentation slides also give
students insight on how to access these modes. The presentation concludes with
telling students what the difference between a soft reset, which doesn’t lose data,
and a hard reset, which resets the entire device.

PowerPoint Presentation for Week Two
Slide 1
iOS Device Forensics
iDevice Hardware
Week 2

Slide 2

Physical Storage



All data stored on internal NAND flash
NAND review:
◦ Limited P/E cycles, page must be erased by
writing all 1’s
◦ Wear leveling applies, but thanks to
encryption, file carving is often a waste of
time

iPhone and iOS forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, p 37
Information Provided by Dan O’Day, intro2iphoneforensics.pdf
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Slide 3

File System


Most iOS runs a version of OSX and
HFSX.
◦ Most useful information is stored in
/private/var2/mobile/ .
◦ Other information can be stored in database
folders.
◦ iOS uses SQLite and plist to store
information.
 We will discuss plist and SQLite in week 4.

http://www.eadatahandlers.co.ke/services/mobile-phone-forensics-services/ios-forensics.html

Slide 4

File Systems Continued


The /private/var2/mobile contains three
folders that will be useful:
◦ Application
◦ Library
◦ Media

http://www.eadatahandlers.co.ke/services/mobile-phone-forensics-services/ios-forensics.html

Slide 5

File Systems


Application
◦ Contains apps stored on the phone. This
includes the name of the app and where it is
stored in the iTunesMetadata.plist



Media
◦ Contains all Pictures/Videos taken, books,
purchases, podcasts, recordings and photos
loaded onto the phone.

http://www.eadatahandlers.co.ke/services/mobile-phone-forensics-services/ios-forensics.html

Slide 6

File Systems


Library

◦ Contains the most useful information! This
includes:
Address Book
Calendar
Favorites
Mail
SMS (SMS Databases which can include deleted SMS
messages)
 Notes
 Etc.






http://www.eadatahandlers.co.ke/services/mobile-phone-forensics-services/ios-forensics.html
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Slide 7

Disk Partitioning Scheme


The iphone is configured with two disk
partitions.
◦ First is on the system (firmware) partition.
 When you upgrade your firmware, this partition is
updated.
 Takes up a small portion of storage space on the
device.
 Read-only be default, except during software
upgrades.
 Partition is formatted by iTunes and does not affect
any of the user data.

iPhone and iOS forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, Page 75

Slide 8

Disk Partitioning Scheme
◦ Second is the data partition (also known as
“slice 2”)
 Takes up the most space on NAND.
 Most, if not all, evidentiary data can be found.
 Information found on this partition can be:
 Default applications
 Applications downloaded through iTunes App Store
 Stored Data

 Once you have a forensic image, you can rename
the it as a “.dmg”

iPhone and iOS forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, Page 75

Slide 9

Disk Partitioning Scheme
Both partitions can be imaged and analyzed,
user data is what is typically acquired.
 According to Dan O’Day, this is where to
find the partitions:


◦ /dev/rdisk0 = entire disk
◦ /dev/rdisk0s1 (Slice 1) = firmware partition
(IPSW)
◦ /dev/rdisk0s2 (Slice 2) = user data partition
(what we want)

 This information was provided by Dan O’Day in his
Introduction to iPhone 4n6 presentation.

Slide 10

Encryption


The following information was also provided by Dan O’Day
and his iPhone forensics presentation.

◦ iOS 3 (3GS): device-level
◦ iOS 4/5: Introduction of Encryption. File System Key (encrypts
entire file system). Also uses Class Key (separate encryption for
each file).
◦ iOS 6: dedicated AES-256 key/crypto engine for each device
(hardware layer), kernel / memory ASLR (between flash storage
and main system memory) and data protection with passcode
(software layer, apps must opt-in and ensure data not shared).
◦ iOS 7: data protection on by default (full encryption at hardware
and software layers). However, still needs a passcode.
◦ iOS 8: Same protection from iOS 7. Includes automatic VPN, and
uses a randomized MAC address when not associated with a
wireless network.
 http://arstechnica.com/apple/2014/09/apple-expands-data-encryptionunder-ios-8-making-handover-to-cops-moot/

Information Provided by Dan O’Day, intro2iphoneforensics.pdf
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1302613-ios-security-guide-sept-2014.html
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Slide 11

Encryption






Good News though!
File system is mostly unlocked once device is
booted up
Baseline encryption is NOT tied to passcode/PIN
Data protection is, however - but only if
passcode/PIN enabled!
According to arstechnica.com, with iOS 8, even
with a warrant, Apple is unable to gain entry into
the device. It is protected by the user’s passcode.
◦ Need the passcode to get the information.

Information Provided by Dan O’Day, intro2iphoneforensics.pdf
http://arstechnica.com/apple/2014/09/apple-expands-data-encryption-under-ios-8-making-handover-tocops-moot/

Slide 12

Operating Modes


Normal Mode



Recovery and DFU

◦ Every day use of the device
◦ To perform certain functions, must place
device in device failsafe utility (DFU) or
recovery mode
◦ Bypasses loading of OS
◦ DFU mode = black screen
◦ Recovery mode
Some of the Information was provided by Dan O’Day, intro2iphoneforensics.pdf
iPhone and iOS Forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, Page 37

Slide 13

Operating Modes


Recovery mode
◦ Power off device
◦ Hold down Home button and plug in while
holding

Some of this information was Provided by Dan O’Day, intro2iphoneforensics.pdf
iPhone and iOS Forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, Page 37

Slide 14

Operating Modes


How to verify your in DFU mode:
◦ DFU mode = black screen
◦ Connect device and ensure powered off
◦ Hold down Power + Home for about 10 seconds
◦ Release Power, but continue holding Home for about
10 more seconds
◦ Release Home button (screen should now be black)
◦ Mac Terminal command:

Some of this information was Provided by Dan O’Day, intro2iphoneforensics.pdf
iPhone and iOS Forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, Page 37
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Slide 15

Operating Modes


Hold Power + Home till you see Apple
logo (reboot)
◦ What if stuck in recovery loop?

 Use iRecovery (cf.
http://theiphonewiki.com/wiki/IRecovery &
https://github.com/iH8sn0w/irecovery)

./irecovery –s
setenv auto-boot true
/exit
 Reboot device
Some of this Information was Provided by Dan O’Day, intro2iphoneforensics.pdf
iPhone and iOS Forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, Page 37

Slide 16

Operating Modes


Soft Reset

◦ To do a soft reset, hold the Home Button and
Sleep/Wake Button for ten seconds. You will get
the apple icon and the phone will restart.
◦ No data will be lost.



Hard Reset

◦ Removes files from the phone. Like a clean slate
for your device.
◦ When going into your device’s settings, there is
an option for a “reset.” This is for the hard reset
we are talking about.

Slide 17

Reminder!!!


For Graduate Students, please turn in
your Abstract for your paper next week, if
you have not done so yet.

Chapter 5 – Week Three: iOS Operating System
This presentation will go into iOS 7 and iOS 8. These two operating
systems are the most used, with iOS 7 quickly being replaced with iOS 8. The
operating system for an iOS device has four main layers: the Core OS, Core
Services, Media and Cocoa Touch.

15

The Core OS contains low-level features. These features can include
networking and Memory management. Along with these features, the framework
and keychain services are found in this layer of the OS. 5 Keychain services work
with certificates on the device.
Core Services are responsible for holding the technologies to support
certain features. A few of these features include Location, iCloud, Social Media
and Networking. As in the Core OS, Keychain Services are also implemented in
this layer. To put simply, Keychain services allow data storage and protection
within the keychain database that is on the device. 6 The Media layer 7 of the
device holds the graphics, audio and video technologies for the device. This is
good to know in a forensics setting. That is because some evidence that can be
found on an iOS device can be video, picture, audio or a combination of one or
more of these areas.
The last layer is the Cocoa Touch 8. This layer contains the infrastructure
for how the device looks. This can also include information on multitasking, push
notifications and touch-based input for the device. What is meant by touch-based
input is the device recognizing when a user touches the screen on the iDevice.
The framework for the user’s Address Book can also be found on this layer.

5

(Apple, 2014)
(Apple, 2014)
7
(Apple, 2014)
8
(Apple, 2014)
6
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The presentation slides for this week touch on the differences between iOS
8 and iOS 7. IOS 8 has more capabilities in photo editing and notifications are
also easier to manage. IOS 8 also has some new features, which include
HealthKit and the new Apple Pay system. The week concludes with a glimpse
into Third Party Applications. Third Party Applications are applications that are
not apple approved. The two locations were applications can be stored,
/var/mobile/Application and var/stash/Application, are shown to the students. A
device normally has to be jailbroken (which will be discussed in week 8) in order
for these types of applications to be installed.

PowerPoint Presentation for Week Three
Slide 1
iOS Device Forensics
iOS Operating System
Week 3

Slide 2

Operating System
The last two operating systems (OS) that
has been used in iOS have been iOS 7 and
iOS 8.
 Not a lot of iDevices still use anything
under iOS 7.
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Slide 3

Operating System
There are many layers to iOS, which is
simliar to the Mac OS.
 The layers we will focus on at the
moment are:


◦
◦
◦
◦

Slide 4

Core OS
Core Services
Media
Cocoa Touch

Operating System


Core OS
◦ This layer contains low-level features, such as
networking, access to external accessories, and
memory management/file system handling.
◦ Framework can be found in this layer, which will deal
with Security or Communication with external
hardware.
◦ Helps the Core Services layer’s Keychain Services by
creating and managing certificates.
 https://developer.apple.com/Library/ios/documentation/Miscell
aneous/Conceptual/iPhoneOSTechOverview/CoreOSLayer/C
oreOSLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40007898-CH11SW1

Slide 5

Operating System


Core Services

◦ Contains the fundamental system services that
applications use.
◦ This is mainly C-based. Why?
 To allow file access and low-level data types.

◦ Important services are Core Foundation and
Foundation Frameworks. Why?

 They define the basic types that all applications use.

◦ Also contains individual technologies to support
features for:





Slide 6

Location
iCloud
Social Media
Networking

Operating Systems


Core Services Continued

◦ Security Services are also found on this layer.
 This includes Keychain Services. What are keychain
services?
 Keychain Services are used to implement data storage and
cryptographic function within the keychain database on the
device.

 Along with security services, we can find that data
protection is in this layer, among other important
features in the iphone.

◦ https://developer.apple.com/Library/ios/document
ation/Miscellaneous/Conceptual/iPhoneOSTechO
verview/CoreServicesLayer/CoreServicesLayer.ht
ml#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40007898-CH10-SW5
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Slide 7

Operating System


Media

◦ Where we find the Graphics, Audio and Video
technologies for the device.
◦ In this layer, we can find the framework for
the Photo Library, Media Player Framework
and Core Graphics.
◦ For devices using AirPlay, we can find
information on this in this layer.
 https://developer.apple.com/Library/ios/documentati
on/Miscellaneous/Conceptual/iPhoneOSTechOvervi
ew/MediaLayer/MediaLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid
/TP40007898-CH9-SW4

Slide 8

Operating System


Cocoa Touch

◦ This layer contains the technologies that
provide the infrastructure for how your
device looks.
◦ This layer also provides the key technologies
such as multitasking, touch-based input, push
notifications and other high-level system
services.
◦ Another feature that can be found on this
level is editing information with the Standard
System View Controllers.

Slide 9

Operating System


Cocoa Touch Continued

◦ A lot of frameworks for basics can be found in
this layers. These frameworks include:





Address Book
Message UI
Notification Center
Twitter

◦ https://developer.apple.com/Library/ios/document
ation/Miscellaneous/Conceptual/iPhoneOSTechO
verview/iPhoneOSTechnologies/iPhoneOSTechnol
ogies.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40007898CH3-SW1

Slide 10

Operating System


iOS 7
◦ Information about the changes in iOS 7 when
it came out can be found on the apple
website:
 http://support.apple.com/kb/DL1682



iOS 8
◦ A lot of the information on iOS 8 can be
found on the apple website:
 https://www.apple.com/ios/
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Operating System


What does iOS 8 have that iOS 7 didn’t?
◦ Besides the new HealthKit and Pay system,
there are a few other differences.
 Through iCloud Drive, users now a Dropbox type
way to access files on your phone through your
computer.
 More Editing Capabilities with photos.
 Notifications are easier to manage.
 More differences can be found here:
 http://www.pcadvisor.co.uk/features/apple/3533759/ios-7-vsios-8-comparison-review/

Slide 12

Third Party Applications and Data
Storage


What is a Third Party Application?

◦ A third party application is an app that was not
developed by Apple, but is for an iDevice.
◦ What are some third party applications?

 Jasmine instead of YouTube
 Tweetbox instead of Twitter
 You can find more examples of third party applications at:

 http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/10-awesome-third-party-apps-their-ios7-updates/
 https://www.bart.gov/schedules/appcenter#



Slide 13

Without a jailbroken phone, it is sometimes
difficult to get to where the stored data is on a
iDevice. We will discuss Jailbreaking in week 8.

Third Party Applications and Data
Storage


There are two locations you can find where
applications are stored:
◦ /var/mobile/Application/

 The folder will give a strange name, and is known to
change randomly. If there are a lot of apps, it can be
time consuming to go through each folder.

◦ Var/stash/Applications

 Contains pre installed applications on the device. These
include the App Store and Maps.
 They don’t have the strange folder structure as the
previous. Easy to get through.
 http://www.iphone-tips-and-advice.com/locate-iphoneapplications.html

Slide 14

Third Party Applications and Data
Storage


So how to get to the files and apps?
◦ There are many tools that can assist in finding
these applications. A few examples of some of
these tools are:
 iFile
 Cydia (for jailbroken phones)
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Third Party Applications and Data
Storage
Not only are third party applications
important to know, but also known apple
apps.
 For instance, Snapchat can ask you to link
your address book to the application,
allowing you to find friends.


◦ This sends your address book to their server to
be seen, which may not be such a good thing.
 http://thenextweb.com/insider/2012/02/15/what-iosapps-are-grabbing-your-data-why-they-do-it-and-whatshould-be-done/

Slide 16

Third Party Applications and Data
Storage


Another example would be Facebook
Messenger’s privacy issues.

◦ It was said that the application was tracking
information and monitoring your activities on
your device.
 http://www.cbc.ca/newsblogs/yourcommunity/2014/09/fa
cebook-messenger-found-to-be-tracking-a-lot-moredata-than-you-think.html

◦ More recent information about this can be found
here:
 http://bgr.com/2014/09/11/facebook-messenger-appprivacy/

Chapter 6 – Week Four and Week Five
Weeks four and five both deal heavily in SQLite, which is a version of
Structured Query Language (SQL). SQL will be discussed in more detail within
week four’s summary.

Week Four: Common File Types
Week four begins with an explanation of Property Lists (plist) and Binary
Property Lists (bplist). A property list, or plist, are data representations used to
store, organize and access various data types on the device, according to the apple
developer library. A Binary Property List, or bplist, is similar to plist. The file size
is condensed by storing certain files in binary. This allowed the application to run
more efficiently. The data that can be found in plists are strings, number, binary
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data and dates. To traverse this data, it is good to know SQLite 9, seeing as this is
a well-known database that iOS devices tend to use. SQL is known to be a
relational database management engine and, according to sqlite.org, is the most
widely deployed database engine.
A relational database means that it contains tables. These tables then have
a Primary Key, which is a unique identifier for a record. These tables also have a
Foreign Key, which shows a relationship between records on different tables. This
is the basic structure for this type of database. The tables then have different
types of data that can be stored. These data can be identified as NULL, Integer 10,
Real 11, Text 12 or BLOB 13. The lecture continues to give students examples of
how to do queries in SQLite with a table. One-To-One relationships and One-ToMany relationships are explained in this week’s lecture as well, along with
examples. An example for a JOIN, which joins the two tables to gain a result, is
given to students to help understand how it works.
PowerPoint Presentation for Week Four
Slide 1
iOS Device Forensics
Common File Types
Week 4

Information for these Slides were provided by Dan O’Day, htcia-sqlite-forensics.pdf

9

A part of SQL
Signed integer, 1-8 bytes
11
Floating point value, 8-Byte IEEE
12
Text string, encoded UTF-8 or 16
13
Binary large object
10
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File Types - Property Lists


Property Lists

◦ Property Lists, also known as plists, are
structured data representations used to store,
organize and access various data types on the
iDevice, as stated in the apple developer library.
◦ There is a heirarchy for these lists which include
3 classes:
 Cocoa Foundation
 Core Foundation
 XML

https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/general/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/AboutInformatio
nPropertyListFiles.html
https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Cocoa/Conceptual/PropertyLists/AboutPropertyLists/AboutPropert
yLists.html

Slide 3

File Types – plist


So what does these classes do?

◦ For XML, according to iPhone and iOS
Forensics (our text book):
 “When a plist is created in XML format, an
application is then able to read from it, while at the
same time converting the XML properties into
their appropriate objects to be used in both the
Cocoa and Core Foundation (Apple INc., 2010)” –
iPhone and iOS Forensics, Hoog
 In other words, XML is able to be read by the
application, then be converted by the device to be
displayed properly.

https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/general/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/AboutInformatio
nPropertyListFiles.html
https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Cocoa/Conceptual/PropertyLists/AboutPropertyLists/AboutPropert
yLists.html

Slide 4

File Types – plist


Nice thing about XML is that the file can
be viewed by using any standard text
editor.

https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/general/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/AboutInformatio
nPropertyListFiles.html
https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Cocoa/Conceptual/PropertyLists/AboutPropertyLists/AboutPropert
yLists.html

Slide 5

File Types – Binary Property Lists
The file size was reduced by storing certain
preference files in binary.
 For some applications, this was done to
make the application more efficient.
 These are called the Binary Property lists
(bplist).
 Example:


◦ Repeated values within a file need to be stored
only once and can be later referenced.

https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/general/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/AboutInformatio
nPropertyListFiles.html
https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Cocoa/Conceptual/PropertyLists/AboutPropertyLists/AboutPropert
yLists.html
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File Types - bplists


In bplists, the XML portion of the plist
must be opened by an application that can
convert it to ASCII.
◦ An example of a type of program that can
open these plists are Plutil (property list
utility).

https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/general/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/AboutInformatio
nPropertyListFiles.html
https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Cocoa/Conceptual/PropertyLists/AboutPropertyLists/AboutPropert
yLists.html

Slide 7

File Types - plist


What data can be found in plists?
◦ Various kinds which can include:





Strings
Numbers
Binary data
Dates

◦ On page 64 of Andrew Hoog’s book, Table 3.1
shows how various data types are
represented to each class.
https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/general/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/AboutInformatio
nPropertyListFiles.html
https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Cocoa/Conceptual/PropertyLists/AboutPropertyLists/AboutPropert
yLists.html

Slide 8

File Types – plist
On the iPhone, plists are used by on the
device n order to present options to the
users.
 Example:


◦
◦
◦
◦

Safari Web Browsing
Safari Bookmarks
YouTube Data
Favorites

https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/general/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/AboutInformatio
nPropertyListFiles.html
https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Cocoa/Conceptual/PropertyLists/AboutPropertyLists/AboutPropert
yLists.html

Slide 9

File Types – plist and bplist




A good reference to turn to for plist and bplist,
look into the CCL Forensics presentation on
“Property Lists in Digital Forensics.”
Another good reference would be the Property
Guide and Information Property List Key
Reference found in the iOS Developer Library

◦ https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentatio
n/Cocoa/Conceptual/PropertyLists/AboutPropertyLis
ts/AboutPropertyLists.html
◦ https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation
/general/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/Ab
outInformationPropertyListFiles.html
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File Types - SQLite


What is SQLite?

◦ SQL = Structured Query Language Lite
◦ It is known as a relational database
management engine.
◦ The entire database is stored in a single file.



So why use SQLite?

◦ This is the most widely deployed database
engine according to sqlite.org.
 http://www.sqlite.org/mostdeployed.html

Information provided by Dan O’Day, hcctia-sqlite-forensics.pdf

Slide 11

File Types - SQLite


So why use SQLite?

◦ It is cross-platform compatible.

 Firefox, Chrome, Safari, Android, Apple, and Linux are
just a few examples of who uses SQLite.

◦ No server required, self-contained file and has no
dependencies.
◦ No configuration or setup needed.
◦ Public Domain
◦ Supported by most programming languages.
◦ Small code footprints, efficient use of memory,
disk space, bandwidth
 Good for Mobile Devices!

Information provided by Dan O’Day, hcctia-sqlite-forensics.pdf

Slide 12

File Types - SQLite


We will talk more about the SQLite
Database File Format next week. This will
include:
◦
◦
◦
◦

Slide 13

Pages
Leaf Pages
Freelist Trunk
B-Trees

SQL


Relational Database
◦ A relational database contains tables. In those
tables, records are contained. Each record
has a unique identifier called a Primary Key
(PK).
◦ A Foreign Key (FK) is when records can have
a relationship with other tables records by
using their PK.
◦

Information provided by Dan O’Day, httcia-sqlite-forensics.pdf
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SQL
•

Data Types
• There are different types of data that
can be stored.
•
•
•
•
•

NULL
Integer (signed integer, 1-8 bytes)
Real (floating point value, 8-byte IEEE)
Text (text string, encoded UTF-8 or 16)
BLOB (binary large object)

Information provided by Dan O’Day, hcctia-sqlite-forensics.pdf
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SQL


Single Table
◦ Example:

Student
Student_ID :: INTEGER (PK)
Student_Last_Name :: VARCHAR(200)
Student_First_Name :: VARCHAR(150)
Student_Major_Department :: VARCHAR(255)

◦ Example with Data:

Information
provided by
Dan O’Day,
Hcctia-sqlite-forensics.pdf

Slide 16

Student
Student_ID :: 001 (PK)
Student_Last_Name :: Smith
Student_First_Name :: John
Student_Major Department :: Computer Science

SQL


One-To-Many Relationship
◦ Example:

STUDENT
Student_ID :: INTEGER (PK)
Student_Last_Name :: VARCHAR(200)
Student_First_Name :: VARCHAR(150)
Student_Major_Department_ID:: INTEGER (FK)

DEPARTMENT
Major_Department_ID :: INTEGER (PK)
Department_Name :: VARCHAR (255)
Information
Provided by Dan
O’Day, hcctiasqlite-forensics.pdf

Slide 17

SQL


One-To-Many Relationship
◦ Example with Data

STUDENT
Student_ID :: 001(PK)
Student_Last_Name :: Smith
Student_First_Name :: John
Student_Major_Department_ID :: 500

Information

DEPARTMENT
Major_Department_ID :: 500
Department_Name :: Computer Science

Provided by
Dan O’Day, hcctia-sqlite-forensics.pdf
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SQL


Parsing Date/Time
◦ To parse the date/time of an iOS in SQL, you
would do the following query:
 SELECT DATETIME (column_name, ‘unixepoch’,
[‘localtime’])
 iOS (Epoch: 1/1/2001) : Add 978307200 seconds to
timestamp

Information provided by Dan O’day, hcctia-sqlite-forensics.pdf

Slide 19

SQL


How to write Basic SQL Queries
◦ A good reference would be the sample
database found on Chinook.
 HTTP://CHINOOKDATABASE.CODEPLEX.
COM

Slide 20

SQL Queries
These queries are for a SINGLE table. These same
methods can be used for a one-to-many relationship later
on.
SELECT * FROM STUDENT;

Slide 21

Student_ID

Student_Last Name

Student_First_Name

Student_Major_Department

001

Smith

John

Computer Science

002

Jones

Betsy

Information
Technology

003

Johnson

Alex

English

004

Martinez

Joe

Computer Science

SQL Queries
SELECT Student_Last_Name,
Student_Major_Department_Name from
STUDENT;
Student_Last_Name

Student_Major_Department_Name

Smith

Computer Science

Jones

Information Technology

Johnson

English

Martinez

Computer Science
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SQL Queries
SELECT DISTINCT
Student_Major_Department_Name FROM
STUDENT BY
Student_Major_Department_Name
Student_Major_Department_Name
Computer Science
Computer Science
English
Information Techonology

Slide 23

SQL Queries
SELECT
Student_ID,
Student_Last_Name,
Student_Major_Department_Name
FROM STUDENT
WHERE Student_ID > 002
ORDER BY Student_Last_Name;

Slide 24

Student_ID

Student_Last_Name

Student_Major_Department_Name

003

Johnson

English

004

Martinez

Computer Science

SQL Queries
SELECT
Student_ID,
Student_Last_Name,
Student_Major_Department_Name
FROM STUDENT
WHERE Student_Major_Department_Name=‘Information Technology’
AND Student_ID=002
ORDER BY Student_Last_Name DESC;

Slide 25

Student_ID

Student_Last_Name

Student_Major_Department_Name

002

Jones

Information Technology

SQL Queries
SELECT
Student_ID AS id,
Student_Last_Name AS last,
Student_Major_Department_Name AS major
FROM STUDENT
WHERE last LIKE ‘Smi%’;

Id

Last

major

001

Smith

Computer Science
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SQL Queries
WHERE Clause Operators
Operator
Equal (also IS)

<>

Not equal (also != and IS NOT)

>

Greater than

<

Less than

>=

Greater than or equal to

<=

Less than or equal to

BETWEEN
LIKE
IN

Slide 27

Description

=

Between an inclusive range
Search for a pattern
Specify multiple possible values for a column

SQL Queries
Wildcard Operators
Operator

Description

%

Substitute for 0+ characters

_

Substitute for 1 character (underscore)

Other Operator
Operator
||

Slide 28

Description
String concatenation operator

SQL Queries
Basic (Aggregate Functions)
Operator Decription
avg(n)

Average of all non-NULL values in n column

count(n)

Count instances of given non-NULL column

lower(x)

Returns x as lowercase ASCII string

upper(x)

Returns x as uppercase ASCII string

max(n)

Returns maximum value in column n

min(n)

Returns minimum value in column n

sum(n)

Sums all non-NULL values (prone to errors
if bad or unexpected input is given)

total(n)

Sums all non-NULL values and returns
floating point value

http://www.sqlite.org/lang_aggfunc.html#minggunc

Slide 29

SQL Queries
These next Query examples will be for
one-to-many relationships.
SELECT * FROM DEPARTMENT;
Major_Department_ID

Department_Name

500

Computer Science

600

Information Technology

700

English
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SQL Queries
SELECT * FROM STUDENT

Slide 31

Student_ID

Student_Last Name

Student_First_Name

Student_Major_Department:_ID

001

Smith

John

500

002

Jones

Betsy

600

003

Johnson

Alex

700

004

Martinez

Joe

500

SQL Queries
SELECT m.Student_Last_Name AS LN, a.Department_Name
FROM STUDENT
JOIN DEPARTMENT a
ON m.Student_Major_Department_ID = a.Major_Department_ID
ORDER BY LN;

LN

Slide 32

Department_Name

Jones

Information Technology

Johnson

English

Martinez

Computer Science

Smith

Computer Science

SQL Statements


JOIN Statements
◦ What are these?
 They return all rows from multiple tables where the
join condition.
 The default for JOIN is an INNER JOIN.
 SQLite limits the JOIN funcationality, however.
 This means there is no RIGHT or FULL OUTER JOIN

Information provided by Dan O’Day, httcia-sqlite-forensics.pdf
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SQL - JOIN
INNER JOIN
(default JOIN)

TABLE A
Id

B_id

Name

1

2

iDevices

2

1

This Class

3

Table
A

Table
B

NULL

TABLE B
Id

name

1

is interesting

2

rock

3

Is boring

30

Slide 34

SQL - JOIN
INNER JOIN
(default JOIN)

Table
A

Slide 35

SELECT A.name, B.name
from A JOIN B on A.b_id =
b.id

Table
B

Name

name

iDevices

rock

This class

Is interesting

SQL - JOIN
With NULL in the b_id, we can do a Left
Outer Join. This compares the tables from
the left, as shown below.
LEFT OUTER JOIN

Table A

SELECT A.name, B.name
from A left out join B on
A.b_id = B.id

Table B

Name

Name

iDevices

Rock

This Class

Is interesting

NULL
Information Provided by Dan O’Day, hcctiasqlite-forensics.pdf
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SQL - JOIN
Another example of a Left Outer Join:
LEFT OUTER JOIN

Table A

Table B

SELECT A.name, B.name from A left
outer join B on A.b_ID = B.id where
B.id is NULL
Name

Name

NULL

Information Provided by Dan O’Day, hcctiasqlite-forensics.pdf

Week Five: Advanced SQLite Analysis
Week five continues with SQLite analysis, giving a bit more detail about
the pages in SQL. Page size is discussed, expressing that a SQLite database can
grow to 140 terabytes. These pages can be used for a single purpose which could
be the following options: Lock-Byte, Freelist, B-Tree, Payload or Pointer.
The Lock-Byte page is not used by SQLite, but its purpose is to lock a file.
Freelist are not active pages. However, this is an important page to know because
31

this is the page where deleted data may reside within the database. If a criminal
has deleted incriminating evidence on an iOS device, the data may not have been
erased from the device. It could be stored, and eventually found, in this area.
These pages are organized by trunk pages, which hold numbers for the freelist
leaf pages. Now a trunk page contains arrays that contain 4-byte integers. These
bytes translate where the data can be found. For instance, the first number
contains the page number of the next freelist trunk page, were as the second
number is the number of leaf page pointers it follows. A leaf page contains no
information that is used in the database because SQLite does not read or write.
A B-Tree, also known as Binary Trees, contain key and data storage.
SQLite recognizes two types of B-Trees: Table and Index. Table b-trees store
data in leaves, which has a key that corresponds to a row id. An index b-tree has
only keys, where no data is stored. With that in mind, a B-Tree page can be one
of two things: An interior page or a leaf page. An interior page contains keys
with pointers to page numbers. However, a leaf page only contains keys. If the
table b-tree is a leaf page, each key will have associated data.
Payload is important for index b-trees. The payload is the arbitrary length
section of the table. When the payload exceeds threshold, only the first few bytes
are stored on the b-tree. The balance is stored in a linked list. This information is
key to know when looking through plists.
This week’s presentation also introduces a Many-To-Many relationship in
SQL databases, as well as CASE statements. A CASE statement looks through a
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list of conditions, and returns one of many possible results. SQLite temporary
files are also introduced, which include WAL files, Shared-Memory files,
Temporary Databases, and rollback journals. A rollback journal allows
restoration of a database. This can be very useful in the case of a corrupted
database. The presentation goes into detail of how a rollback journal is done,
which includes a series of locks on the journal until the new rollback is created.
When this is done, the lock is released. Similar to a rollback journal is the WriteAhead log. This is faster for applications with more writing permissions than read
permissions. The write-ahead log allows for multiple transactions to occur, where
the rollback journal does not.
Week five’s presentation concludes with Deleted Record Recovery. Not
many would know that even if data is deleted off of a device, it does not mean
that the data is gone, due to free pages and the other pages discussed during this
lecture. To try and recover this data, examiners would carve for the database. By
carve, we mean to reconstruct. When an examiner states that they will be carving
for database, they will be attempting to reconstruct the database to gain
information. The examiner would then parse the trees for the information.
Students will be informed that the entire database will not be recovered. What is
suggested is that they carve for individual SQLite records. It is also mentioned
that most approaches are proprietary to tool manufactures in mobile device
forensics.
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PowerPoint Presentation for Week Five
Slide 1
iOS Device Forensics
Advanced SQLite Analysis
Week 5

Information provided by Dan O’Day, httcia-sqlite-forensics.pdf
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SQLite Database File Format
A Database file consists of one or more
pages.
 When parsing any multi-byte ineger value
in SQLite, read it using big endian.


◦ http://www.sqlite.org/fileformat.html

Information provided by Dan O’Day, httcia-sqlite-forensics.pdf
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SQLite – Page Size







Page size is a power of two. It is between
512 [2^9] and 65536 [2^16].
Pages within a database file are all the same
size.
Page is a 2-byte integer (big endian) at byte
offset 16.
Maximum number of pages = 2147483646
This means that a SQLite Database can grow
to approximately 140TB.
The total number of pages is stored as a 4byte integer at byte offset 28.

http://www.sqlite.org/fileformat.html

Slide 4

Information provided by Dan O’Day,
hcctia-sqlite-forensics.pdf

SQLite – Page Uses


So what are these pages used for?
◦ Every page has a single purpose. It can be one
of the following:






Lock-Byte page
Freelist Page
B-Tree Page
Payload Overflow Page
Pointer Map Page

http://www.sqlite.org/fileformat.html

Information provided by Dan
O’Day
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SQLite


Lock-Byte Page

◦ This page is set aside for OS-Specific
implementation of file locking.
 This is not used by SQLite.



Freelist Page

◦ These pages are not in active use.
◦ These maintains a list of page numbers where
DELETED data may reside within the logical
database file.
 This can be useful when we cover Deleted Record
Recovery.

http://www.sqlite.org/fileformat.html

Slide 6

Information provided by Dan
O’Day, htccia-sqlite-forensics.pdf

SQLite – Freelist Page
They are organized as linked list of free
list trunk pages which contain page
numbers for 0+ free list leaf pages.
 Number of freelist pages are stored as 4byte integer at byte offset 32.


http://www.sqlite.org/fileformat.html

Slide 7

Information provided by Dan
O’Day, htccia-sqliteforensics.pdf

SQLite – Freelist Page


Trunk Page

◦ This contains an array of 4-byte integers.

 The array will store as many integers as will fit within a
page.

◦ The first integer contains the page number of the
next free list trunk page.
 Or 0 if it is the last freelist trunk page.

◦ The second integer is the number of leaf page
pointers to follow.



Leaf Page

◦ This page contains no information currently used
in the Database.
 SQLite doesn’t read or write.

http://www.sqlite.org/fileformat.html
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Information provided by Dan O’Day,
htccia-sqlite-forensics.pdf

SQLite – B-Tree Pages


Binary Trees
◦ Key/Data Storage is here
 Most keys are variable integers, variants, between 1
and 9 bytes.



SQLite has two types:
◦ 1 – Table b-trees
 Stores data in leaves. The key corresponds to
rowid

◦ 2 – Index b-trees
 No data is stored. Only Keys.
http://www.sqlite.org/fileformat.html

Information provided by Dan O’Day,
htccia-sqlite-forensics.pdf
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SQLite – B-Tree Pages


The B-Tree page is either:
◦ An interior page
 The keys with pointers to child b-tree pages. i.e.,
page #
 Key + pointer on left = “cell”

◦ Leaf Page
 It contains keys
 If table b-tree each key will have associated data.

http://www.sqlite.org/fileformat.html
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Information provided by Dan O’Day,
htccia-sqlite-forensics.pdf

SQLite – Payload


The “payload” of a cell = arbitrary length section



When payload exceeds theshold, only the first
few bytes are stored on the b-tree page.
Balance is stored in a linked list of content
overflow pages.
First four bytes of payload overflow page stores
page number of next page in chain.
Overflow:





◦ For index b-trees this is key!
◦ For table b-tree leaf pages this is the content, and
interior table b-trees have no payload.

◦ http://forensicsfromthesausagefactory.blogspot.com/2
011/07/sqlite-overflow-pages-and-other-loose.html

http://www.sqlite.org/fileformat.html
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Information provided by Dan O’Day,
htccia-sqlite-forensics.pdf

SQLite – Pointer Map


Extra pages inserted into the database to
make VACUUM more efficient.



All other page types in database have
pointers from parent to child.

◦ VACUUM will be discussed more later.

◦ Pointer Map (ptrmap) is the exact opposite.
◦ Pointers are from child to parent.



Page 2 is a Ptrmap when AUTO_VACUUM
is enabled.

◦ http://forensicsfromthesausagefactory.blogspot.co
m/2011/05/sqlite-pointer-maps-pages.html

http://www.sqlite.org/fileformat.html
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Information provided by Dan O’Day,
htccia-sqlite-forensics.pdf

SQL


Many-To-Many Relationship
◦ Example
Student

Student_ID :: INTEGER (PK)
Student_Last_Name ::VARCHAR(200)
Student_First_Name ::VARCHAR(150)

Student_Department
Student_Department_ID :: INTEGER (PK)
Student_Major_Student_ID :: INTEGER (FK)
Student_Depart_Department_ID :: INTEGER (FK)

Department
Information
Provided by

Major_Department_ID :: INTEGER (PK)
Department_Name :: VARCHAR (255)

Dan O’Day, htccia-sqlite-forensics.pdf
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SQL


The Tables we will use for examples for Many-To-Many
Relationships:
Student

Student_ID

Student_Last_Name

Student_First_Name

001

Smith

John

Department

Major_Department_ID

Department_Name

500

Computer Science

Student_Department

Slide 14

Student_Department_ID

Student_Department_Student_ID

Student_Depart_Deparment_ID

1

001

500

SQL – CASE Statements


CASE Statements
◦ Using the Chinook database, we know the
type values:
 1 is sent
 2 is received
 3 is an error

◦ We also know the flag
values:
 R is read
 U is unread
Information Provided by
Dan O’Day and Chinook
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SQL – CASE Statements


This is an example using what we learned
last week to work with CASE statements.

Information Provided by Dan
O’Day and Chinook
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SQLite - Rollback Journal


What is a rollback journal?
◦ This allows restoration of a database to its
original state.
◦ When writing to a database with a rollback
journal, it creates the rollback journal file with
original data being altered.
◦ It is stored in the same folder as the database
with ‘-journal’ filename suffix.
◦ This is the default behavior of SQLite.

http://www.sqlite.org/atomiccommit.html

Information provided by Dan
O’Day
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SQLite – Rollback Journal


How Rollback Journal works…

◦ “shared lock” placed on database file
 This allows multiple reads but prevents writing while
reading.



Only a subset of pages in the database file
are read.

◦ But always writes a complete “sector” of data.
◦ Freelist pages are not journaled!



“reserved” lock placed on the database file
prevents any writes from other processes.
◦ This signals intent to write.

http://www.sqlite.org/atomiccommit.html
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Information provided by Dan
O’Day

SQLite - Rollback Journal


The rollback journal file is created.



The header contains original database file size.
Pages are modified in user space (RAM)
It will flush contents of journal file to non-volatile
storage

◦ Most OS’s do not write this file to disk initially. It is stored
in the cache only.




◦ Forces write to disk
◦ This is a crucial step so database can survive unexpected
power loss.



“Exclusive Lock” obtained

◦ “pending lock” is issued first which allows any existing
‘shared locks’ to finish but allows no new locks
 Preventing ‘writer starvation’

http://www.sqlite.org/atomiccommit.html
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Information provided by Dan
O’Day

SQLite – Rollback Journal
Changes are written to the database file
and then flushed to the disk.
 The rollback journal is then deleted


◦ Transaction now considered “committed”


The lock is then released.

http://www.sqlite.org/atomiccommit.html
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Information provided by Dan
O’Day

SQLite - Rollback Journal
Something to know is that deleting files is
‘expensive’ on many file systems.
 SQLite can be configured so that either:


◦ 1 – the journal header is zeroed out
 This means that the next time a journal is needed,
the existing one is simply overwritten rather than
creating a ‘new’ file.

◦ 2 – The journal file is truncated to 0 byte file
size.
http://www.sqlite.org/atomiccommit.html

Information provided by Dan
O’Day
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SQLite – “Hot Rollback Journal”
This is when something goes wrong and the
data is only partially written and/or not
written when it should have been.
 The database is inconsistent and must be
repaired.
 The incomplete changed are rolled back


◦ Exclusive lock obtained
◦ Content from rollback journal written to
Database
◦ Truncate database file back to its original size
◦ Delete ‘hot’ journal

http://www.sqlite.org/atomiccommit.html
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Information provided by Dan
O’Day

SQLite – Write-Ahead Log






Write-Ahead logs (WAL) allows concurrent
reads and writes.
Faster for applications with more writes
than reads, but only for smaller transactions.
More efficient use of I/O operations
Page size cannot be changed
Requires shared memory by all processes
using database
◦ -shm files with no persistent content
 i.e., cant’ be used over network.



Often can’t be read on read-only media.

http://www.sqlite.org/wal.html
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Information provided by Dan
O’Day

SQLite – Write-Ahead Log


It’s an inversion of the rollback journal
process.
◦ Oringal content is preserved in database file.
◦ Changes appended to the WAL file
◦ Transaction considered ‘committed’ when
special record appended to WAL
 Even if change actually has not yet been written to
database file

◦ Allows multiple transaction to occur
‘simultaneously.’
http://www.sqlite.org/wal.html
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Information provided by Dan
O’Day

SQLite – Write-Ahead Log


Checkpointing

◦ This transfers all transactions appended to WAL to the
original database file.
◦ Automatically occurs when WAL reaches threshold of
1000 pages by default.
◦ When WAL is committed to disk, new appended
transactions begin overwriting the WAL file.



Wal-index in shared memory tracks reads to ensure
proper data is returned at time requested, factoring
in ‘commits.’

◦ Read request checks wal-index to see if page requested is
in WAL.
 If not, the page from the original database file is returned.
 If so, most recent version of the page is returned from the WAL
file.

http://www.sqlite.org/wal.html

Information provided by Dan
O’Day
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SQLite – Temporary Files Created
by SQLite


These are the types of temp files created by SQLite:
◦
◦
◦
◦

Rollback Journals (-journal)
WAL files (-wal)
Shared-memory files (-shm)
Statement Journals

 Given random name, location may not be in same directory as
database, used to rollback single statement for larger transactions,
look for etilqs)

◦ TEMP databases

 Get its own database file and respective rollback journal

◦ Master Journals

 Only when single transaction makes changes to multiple
databases that are using the same connection

◦ Transient indices/databases

 Usually associated with VACUUM

http://www.sqlite.org/tempfiles.html
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SQLite Deleted Record Recovery




When information is deleted, the pages where it was stored
are added to a list of free pages, as stated in the previous
page. That way, they can be reused the next time data is
inserted.
However, when an entire page is NOT deleted, something
called “freeblocks” are created.
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Information provided by Dan
O’Day

Freeblocks are unallocated space in a page either below or between
allocated records. They have 4-byte headers pointing to the next
freeblock.
The deleted records reside in both freeblocks and unallocated space
in the logical database file.

A good thing to know is that if the database has
AUTO_VACUUM = TRUE, then all free pages are moved to
the end of the database file and the database is condensed
after every commit.

SQLite Deleted Record Recovery


In iOS…
◦ You can get a good recovery of allocated
database content.
◦ Prior to 4S, you can get a good recovery of
latent/unallocated SQLite files.

Slide 28

SQLite Deleted Record Recovery


VACUUM

◦ When a large amount of data is deleted from the
database, it leaves behind “free” pages.
 This makes the database larger than it really needs to
be.

◦ Frequent writes can cause the database to
become fragmented.
◦ Contents of the enter database are copied into a
temp database. Then the original is overwritten.
◦ When overwriting an original, a rollback journal,
or WAL, is used as normal.
http://www.sqlite.org/lang_vacuum.html

Information provided by Dan
O’Day
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SQLite Deleted Record Recovery Approaches


Carve for databases
◦ Easy-to-find header, but no footer
◦ File length not stored within file
 Meaning you must check each page in ‘chain’

◦ Must parse b-trees and other SQLite specific
structures
 B-trees were discussed earlier.

Slide 30

SQLite Deleted Record Recovery –
Approaches


Don’t recover entire database’s. Carve for
individual SQLite records in unallocated space /file
slack of latent files.
◦ OK for text messages and other single-table data,
but not for relational data where multiple tables
are needed.
◦ No schema or Data Structure.

Vacuum one copy of the database and
compare the differences between that and
an un-vacuumed copy.
 Most approaches are proprietary to tool
manufacturers in mobile device forensics.
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SQLite Deleted Record Recovery –
Approaches


You could also use Python
◦ Speeds up the process
◦ Focus on finding unallocated/free table b-leaf
pages.
 This is not a python class, however someone did
this all for us.
 http://az4n6.blogspot.com.es/2013/11/python-parser-to-recoverdeleted-sqlite.html, Mari DeGrazia

Chapter 7 – Week Six: Analysis Strategies and Commercial Tools
Week six begins with file carving. File carving was discussed briefly in
the previous week. To refresh, file carving is a process that specifies file types,
which are searched and extracted. 14 File carving examines the binary data, and
then identifies the file based on their file header. It is also good to know that if

14

(Hoog & Strzempka, Acquistions: File Carving, 2011)
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the file format has a known header; it will be scanned from header until it does
find the footer. Only when these steps are done, the data is saved to a disk for
examination.
During file carving, one should remember that files do not always stay
pristine. Files are sometimes fragmented, similar to a computer having
fragmented files. It is important to know about fragment files because when the
file carving techniques require that the data is sequential in the image. What this
just means is that the carving will not produce a full file it is fragmented.
Fragmenting can happen in many ways. One way for fragmenting can
occur is the memory type, as well as the process of saving a file to nonvolatile
storage. This can also mean that larger files, such as videos, are harder to recover.
The process of file carving normally includes a configuration file for the tool, the
data carving tool itself and the disk image that has the desired data. The tool will
find the data, and the results will be grouped by the file type upon completion.
Students will learn about string extractions. Strings are extracted using
ASCII 15 printable strings. This type of extraction is normally used on a Linux
workstation. In this setting, these strings are normally at least four characters
long. This type of analysis is effective for quick examination for information that
can be of interest. However, this technique is not refined.

16

15

American Standard Code for Information Interchange. This is a code that represents a single
unique character.
16
(Hoog & Strzempka, Acquisitions: Strings, 2011)
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When doing this type of analysis, there are a few options to keep in mind,
which are given to the students. For instance, “—all” options tell strings to
examine the entire file and “—radix” options tell strings to print the offset within
the file where the string is found. 17 The “—radix” can also be helpful when
combining strings to find evidence.
String extraction can be very useful and powerful. With a combination of
searching and filters, examiners can determine important data such as phone
numbers, name, locations, GPS coordinates and dates. One must remember that
other tools can be used to find more data.
Students will learn this week about metadata as well. Metadata is data that
gives more information on a data. A device can hold exchangeable image file
(EXIF) data, EXIF geolocation and embedded timestamps, which are types of
metadata. The EXIF data is normally associated with digital pictures and videos,
and can give information about Date, Time and Location of the media. For
example, a digital picture’s EXIF data would tell what date the picture was taken,
what time the picture was taken and where the picture was taken. EXIF
Geolocation, also known as a geotag, stores the longitude and latitude of where
the picture or video was taken. This can be crucial in an investigation, especially
if a photograph or video of the crime scene is discovered on the device. The
embedded timestamp gives an accurate time as to when the media was taken,
helping investigators determine a timeline. It is important to note that timestamps
work on absolute time. This just means that it is in the number of seconds since
17

(Hoog & Strzempka, Acquisitions: Strings, 2011)

43

January 1st, 2001. Thankfully, tools are available to calculate the time for
examiners so they do not have to do the calculations by time.
The presentation concludes with tools that examiners might use in the
field. These tools include Cellebrite UFED, Katana Forensics Lantern, Elcom iOS
Forensic Toolkit and AccessData Mobile Phone Examiner Plus. Each tool is given
a brief explanation. Most of these tools require a license purchase in order for it
to be used.

PowerPoint Presentation for Week Six
Slide 1
iOS Device Forensics
Analysis Strategies and Commercial Tools
Week 6

Slide 2

File Carving


What is file carving?



So how does it work?

◦ File Carving is a process that specified file types
are searched and extracted.

 This can be across binary data. Most often it is forensic
image of a disk or partition.

◦ By examining the binary data and identifying files
based on their known file header.
◦ If the file format has a known footer, it will scan
from the header until it find the footer.
 Or hits a maximum file length set by the configuration
file.

◦ It is then saved to disk for further examination.
iPhone and iDevice Forensics, Hoog, p138
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File Carving







Files are sometimes fragmented, much like how a
computers files are fragmented.
Traditional File carving techniques required that
the data is sequential in the image. This means it
will not pick up produce a full file if it is
fragmented.
File can become fragmented in many ways.

◦ The process for saving the file to nonvolatile storage
varies by file system type.
◦ The strong influence of memory type also plays a part
in why a file is fragmented.

This also means that larger files, like videos, will
be harder to recover.

iPhone and iDevice Forensics, Hoog, p138

Slide 4

File Carving


The Data Carving process normally includes
a few things:
◦ The configuration file for the tool

 Contains details related to the file types that are going
to be carved out of the image.

◦ The data carving tool

 Search the raw data for signatures of the file types
referenced in the configuration file.

◦ A disk image that has the desired data.


The results of the tool will be grouped by
file type once the data carving is completed.

iPhone and iDevice Forensics, Hoog, p139
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Strings Extraction


On a linux workstation, the string
command will extract ASCII printable
strings.
◦ They will be at least four characters long.
◦ They will be from any file, text or binary.



String Extraction is quite effective at
quickly examining binary data for
information that can be of interest.
◦ However, this is not a sophisticated technique.

iPhone and iDevice Forensics, Hoog, p144

Slide 6

String Extraction


Here are a few options you need to keep in
mind when executing strings:
◦ “--all” options tells strings to examine the entire
file.
 Note: On certain files, this will only examine certain
portions of the file.

◦ “--radix” options tells strings to print the offset
within the file where the string was found.
◦ Character encoding of the strings that provide
support for the Unicode characters in both Big
and little endian formats.
iPhone and iDevice Forensics, Hoog, p145
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String Extraction


Back to “--radix” option…
◦ This is very helpful! When and why?
 This is helpful when you combine strings and a hex
editor to find evidence.
 This option can print the offset in octal (--radix=o),
hex (--radix=x) or decimal (--radix=d).
 If using a hex editor, best option would be hex or
decimal.

iPhone and iDevice Forensics, Hoog, p145

Slide 8

String Extraction
Strings can be a very powerful command
that examiners can use when combining
searching and filters.
 With this combination, examiners can
determine phone numbers, names,
locations, GPS coordinates, dates and
other information found on a data file.
 However, there are other tools that can
be used to find more data. This is just one
options.


Slide 9

Metadata


What is metadata?
◦ Data that provides information about one or
more aspect of the data.
 For example, Digital Photographs have metadata
though it’s EXIF (Exchangable Image File).



So what metadata can idevices have?
◦ EXIF geolocation
◦ Embedded timestamps
◦ Can be included in pictures through EXIF.

http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/forensic-analysis-ios-devices-34092

Slide 10

Metadata - EXIF


Exchangeable Image File (EXIF) Format is
used to store digital pictures.



EXIF data can be used to find metadata
about the media used. This includes:

◦ This can also include videos!!!!
◦ Date

 When the picture on the idevice was taken.

◦ Time

 What time the picture was taken.

◦ Location

 Location, called EXIF Geolocation, will be covered in
more detail in the next slide.

http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/forensic-analysis-ios-devices-34092
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Metadata – EXIF Geolocation
Geolocation, or a Geotag, is the GPS data
that can be found in an image’s header.
 What it stores is the longitude and
latitude of where the picture or video
was taken.


◦ This can be very beneficial for when there are
incriminating pictures found on a phone that
can help a case.

http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/forensic-analysis-ios-devices-34092
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Metadata – EXIF Geolocation


Surprisingly, there are apps on iTunes that can show you EXIF data
for photographs.



Some require you to pay for the service, while others are free.



However, they may not be able to retrieve all the information that
a forensics tool can.

http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/forensic-analysis-ios-devices-34092
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Metadata – Embedded Timestamp



Everything in iOS has a Timestamp to when the
volume was created.
It should be noted that when working with
timestamps, it will be provided in CF Absolute
Time.

◦ This means that the number of seconds since January
1st, 2001.



The formula to find the time of the timestamp is
the following:



Thankfully there are tools that can help us
translate the time for us.

◦ =CreatedTime/(60*60*24)+DATE(2001,1,1)
◦ http://www.epochconverter.com/

http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/forensic-analysis-ios-devices-34092
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Metadata – Embedded Timestamp


Here are some examples of places to find
Embedded Timestamps:
◦
◦
◦
◦



Pictures
Notes
Text Messages
GPS

A good reference for more information
about Timestamps and Time Utilities would
be on the Mac Developer Library:

◦ https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documen
tation/CoreFoundation/Reference/CFTimeUtils/R
eference/reference.html
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Capabilities and Limitations of
Current Tools


The most recent product for Cellebrite
UFED is the UFED Touch Ultimate.

◦ http://www.cellebrite.com/mobileforensics/products/standalone/ufed-touchultimate
◦ It can do a lot of things for examiners such as:






Extractions
Decoding
Analysis and Reporting
Physical and logical acquisitions
File system and password extraction.

◦ It also comes with cables to use with the UFED,
as well as handling multiple languages.

Slide 16

Capabilities and Limitations of
Current Tools

◦ For iPhones, Cellebrite supports Apple devices
running IOS3+.
 It does not say anything about IOS 8, but the tool may
or may not have capabilities for it.

◦ It can also be used for other devices like
blackberry and android devices.
◦ You do have to buy a license in order to use this
tool.
◦ Here is a video of an older version of Cellebrite
UFED on an iPhone. This can show what the tool
is capable of before the most current version:
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NFRAy3PyRx4

Slide 17

Capabilities and Limitations of
Current Tools


Katana Forensics Lantern
◦ https://katanaforensics.com/products/
◦ One of the more popular mobile forensics
applications out today.
◦ The tool is capable of many things that are
beneficial for examiners. This can include:





Slide 18

Multiple Device Acquisitions within one case file.
Logical and Physical Extractions on IOS devices
Passcode Recovery of IOS.
And many more on the Katana website.

Capabilities and Limitations of
Current Tools

◦ However, this tool is not free. There is a
License that you have to buy in order to use
the product.
◦ A drawback of this tool is that it is also only
able to be used on Mac OS and Linux
machines.
◦ Here are a few videos on Katana Forensics:
 Acquiring an iPhone
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZJ80yo1KMY&list=UUE8I-7OP_i1qJLhbqEP0NqQ
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Capabilities and Limitations of
Current Tools


Elcom iOS Forensic Toolkit
◦ http://www.elcomsoft.com/eift.html
◦ This tool is available for both Mac OS and
Windows OS.
◦ This tool is capable of a lot of useful things,
which include:
 Acquire device images.
 Supports all versions of iOS from 3 to 7
 8 is not available yet.

 Physical and Logical acquisition available

Slide 20

Capabilities and Limitations of
Current Tools

◦ This tool highlights that it is able to gain more
information then is what is in the backups,
including passwords, usernames, email messages,
SMS and mail files.
◦ You do have to buy the toolkit in order to use it.
◦ This video is more of an advertisement then an
actual demonstration, but it does highlight a lot of
what the toolkit is capable of:
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8_zZGCnmWkE&lis
t=PLNaP4c_hyMYyD1mH0v7vGCNCU4I7Rg5kL

◦ This video shows a bit more in how to use the
tool:

 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=05ly9hC61Ms&list=P
LNaP4c_hyMYyD1mH0v7vGCNCU4I7Rg5kL&index=2
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Capabilities and Limitations of
Current Tools


AccessData Mobile Phone Examiner Plus
(MPE+)
◦ http://accessdata.com/solutions/digitalforensics/mpe?/solutions/digitalforensics/mobile-phone-examiner
◦ Supports over 7000 cell phones and mobile
devices, includign IOS, Android,Windows
Mobile and Blackberry
◦ The tool promotes that it is easy to use and
needs virtually zero training.

Slide 22

Capabilities and Limitations of
Current Tools

◦ There are many attachments to it, such as MPE+
Velocitor and MPE+ nFIELD.
 nField performs Logical and Physical Acquisitions in a
guided manner. It can also be used on any device
running Windows 7 or higher.
 Velocitor can perform physical and logical extraction
from Chinese mobile devices.

◦ It also has a plist viewer and visualization tools.
◦ Can be downloaded from the site!
◦ Another video showing a demonstration:
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=luTtK7WWTyc
 Go to time 4:00 to show how MPE+ can be seen in ios. Yes,
the iphone 3g is old, but it is still a good example.
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Chapter 8 – Week Seven: Introduction to iOS Security
Week seven gives students an introduction to iOS security. Students are
then introduced to wiping the device through different methods. The first
discussed is iCloud Remote Wiping. This option allows the device to be erased
through iCloud. The application “Find my iPhone” is an example of this. If the
device is lost, missing or stolen, the device can be erased remotely. It is
confirmed by using the users Apple ID and password.
The next method is just a secure erase. This wipes the clean, which can be
done through the “erase all content and settings” option in the device. This option
was not always available to the devices. Up until iOS 2.0, the devices would not
be securely erased. With the release of iOS 3.0, apple introduced hardware-level
encryption which allowed a faster and secure wipe process. 18 With the standard
hardware encryption generates an encryption key. When the device is erased, the
encryption key is wiped and lost. With no encryption key, the data cannot be
interpreted.
Keychains are also mentioned once more in this presentation. The
keychain works as a secure storage container, which holds passwords and
multiple applications. In iOS, each application has access to its own keychain
items, which means that applications cannot access other applications items.
Keychain backups are also discussed, which happens whenever the device’s data
is backed up. The keychain remains encrypted with the keys throughout the

18

(Hollington, 2013)
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backup, however. Examples are then given to the students to help explain this
point.
NSProtectionNone is a hardware deduced key by the application or OS
data. If a file is created without specifying any accessibility constant, it is marked
as NSProtectionNone. Before iOS 5, apple could return the NSProtectionNone
data from locked devices. Up until iOS 8, apple could get information off a locked
device. Due to apple’s new privacy policy, apple cannot gain access to an iOS 8
device.
This point is important to know when dealing with search warrants for
devices. Even with a warrant from law enforcement, Apple cannot gain access to
an iOS 8 device without the user’s passcode. Normally with the proper
paperwork, law enforcement agencies can get the data off a device to help with a
case. This is still true with iOS 7 and below. According to Zdziarksi, some user
generated active files that can be provided are Photos, Video, Contact and Call
History.
This presentation also goes back to discussing encryption, which was
discussed in week two’s lecture. Data protection is discussed, including how it is
constructed and managed by a hierarchy of keys. They build on the encryption
technologies that already exist on the iOS device.
For data protection, there are classes that can be assigned when a new file
is created. These basic classes are complete protection, protected unless open,
protected until first user authentication and no protection. Complete protection
51

can be compared to unlocking an iDevice using a passcode or fingerprint.
Protected unless open allows encryption that runs in the background, such as
when an attachment is being downloaded. Protected until first user authentication
acts like complete protection, but does not remove the decrypt key when the
device is locked. No protection means that the device is only protected with the
unique user id (UID). 19
To conclude this presentation, iOS Backup is discussed. Backups can
occur through iTunes or through the iCloud. The iPhone Analyzer is useful for
working with backups that need to be decrypted without a passcode.

PowerPoint Presentation for Week Seven
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iOS Security – iCloud Remote
Wiping


What is iCloud Remote Wiping?

◦ It is an option to erase your iDevice through
iCloud. It is normally associated with the “Find
My iPhone.”
 This app can also find and lock lost devices.

◦ This is done by using your Apple ID password to
confirm.
◦ Once the phone is found, you can have an option
to restore the phone through a backup.
 http://www.cultofmac.com/266448/remotely-wipeiphone-data-stolen-ios-tips/
 http://support.apple.com/kb/PH2701

19

(Apple, 2014)
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iOS Security – Secure Erase


A secure erase of an iDevice wipes the
device clean.
◦ A good example of a Secure Erase is the
“Erase All Content and Settings” option built
into iDevices.



Earlier iDevices (especially the original
iPhone) did not securely erase data.
◦ This was changed in iOS 2.0.

http://www.ilounge.com/index.php/articles/comments/securely-erasing-an-iphone/

Slide 4

iOS Security – Secure Erase


When iOS 2.0 came out, erasing data
securely was done by doing a bit-by-bit
wipe of the flash memory.
◦ This took 1 – 3 hours depending on the
device.



When iOS 3.0 came out, apple had
introduced hardware-Level encryption.
Why?
◦ This allowed a fast, secure wipe process.

http://www.ilounge.com/index.php/articles/comments/securely-erasing-an-iphone/
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iOS Security – Secure Erase




The standard hardware encryption does not
specifically protect your data during normal use.
What it does is generate a device-specific
encryption key.
Seeing how everything stored in the device’s flash
memory is encrypted with this key, the “Erase All
Content and Settings” option simply needs to
securely wipe the encryption key.

◦ This allows everything else in the device’s memory to
be a bunch of encrypted data that can not be read.
There is no more key!

http://www.ilounge.com/index.php/articles/comments/securely-erasing-an-iphone/
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iOS Security - Keychain


What is a keychain?
◦ A keychain is an encrypted container. It holds
passwords and multiple applications .
◦ It is also a secure storage container.
 This means that when the keychain is locked, no
one can access it’s protected contents.



In iOS, each application has access to it’s
own keychain items.
◦ This also means that the application does not
have access to any other application’s items.

https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/Security/Conceptual/keychainServConcepts/02con
cepts/concepts.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP30000897-CH204-SW9
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iOS Security - Keychain


iPhone Keychain Backups
◦ When a user backs up iPhone data, the
keychain data is backed up.
◦ However the secrets in the keychain remain
encrypted. This means that the keychain
password is not included in the backup.
◦ This means that passwords and other secrets
stored in the keychain cannot be used by
someone who gains access to the backup.

https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/Security/Conceptual/keychainServConcepts/02con
cepts/concepts.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP30000897-CH204-SW9

Slide 8

iOS Security - Keychain




It is good to know that Keychain Services uses a keyvalue dictionary to specify the attributes of the
keychain item that you want to search for.
According to Keychain Services Programming Guide,
typical search dictionary consists of:

◦ The class key value pair. This specifies the class of items to
search. i.e., internet passwords or cryptographic keys
◦ One of more key-value pairs that specify the attribute data
to be matched. This can be a label or creation date.
◦ One or more search Key-value pairs. These specify values
that further hone the search. This can be issuing
certificates or email address to match.
◦ A return-type key-value pair. This specifies the type of
results you want.

https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/Security/Conceptual/keychainServConcepts/02con
cepts/concepts.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP30000897-CH204-SW9

Slide 9

iOS Security - Keychain
Keychain Services Programming Guide found
on the iOS Developer Library gives a good
example of using the dictionary:
 The following example is taken from the
developer library. The link is provided near
the bottom of this slide.


◦ Lets say we wanted to perform a case-insensitive
search for a password. The account name that
has the password we want is “ImaUser”.

 You can use the following dictionary shown on the next
slide with the SecItemCopyMatching Function.
https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/Security/Conceptual/keychainServConcepts/02con
cepts/concepts.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP30000897-CH204-SW9

Slide 10

iOS Security - Keychain


This chart was taken from Keychain Services Programming Guide
found on the iOS Developer Library
◦ https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/Security/Conceptual/keychainServCo
ncepts/02concepts/concepts.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP30000897-CH204-SW1
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iOS Security - Keychain


The kSecReturnData key causes the function
to return the keychains item’s data.
◦ This would be the password we were searching
for.



If we wanted a dictionary of attribute keys
and values, we can use the
kSecReturnAttributes return-type key with a
value of kCFBooleanTrue.
◦ This option can help determine the creation date
of the item.

https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/Security/Conceptual/keychainServConcepts/02con
cepts/concepts.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP30000897-CH204-SW9

Slide 12

iOS Security – NSProtectionNone
data


What is NSProtectionNone?



If a file is created without specifying any
accessibility constant, then the file is marked as
NSProtectionNone.

◦ All native application/OS data is encrypted with a key
not married to the passcode. However, it is encrypted
with a hardware deduced key (NSProtectionNone).

◦ It is accessible even when the device is locked.

 http://www.securitylearn.net/2012/10/18/extracting-dataprotection-class-from-files-on-ios/



Before iOS 5, if Apple was provided with the
device, they could return the NSProtectionNone
data from passcode locked devices.

https://pentest.com/ios_backdoors_attack_points_surveillance_mechanisms.pdf

Slide 13

iOS Security – Search Warrants




Of course, before an examiner can look into an iDevice, they
need to have a warrant.
The search warrant has to be specific for what you can find.
According to Jonathan Zdziarski, Apple can extract certain
categories of active data from passcode locked iOS 7 or
older devices when provided a valid search warrant.
◦ https://pentest.com/ios_backdoors_attack_points_surveillance_
mechanisms.pdf



As stated in a previous lecture, even a search warrant may
not be enough for Apple to access a user’s iOS 8 Device.
Due to an updated privacy policy, Apple can not access the
device.

◦ http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2014/09/17
/2612af58-3ed2-11e4-b03f-de718edeb92f_story.html

Slide 14

iOS Security – Search Warrant


However, this is only for user generated active files
on the devices. And this is also for data that is not
encrypted using the passcode.



The categories of user generated active files that can
be provided according to Zdziarski are the following:

◦ This data can be extracted and provided to law
enforcement.
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦

SMS
Photo
Video
Contact
Audio Recording
Call History

https://pentest.com/ios_backdoors_attack_points_surveillance_mechanisms.pdf

55

Slide 15

iOS Security – Search Warrant



However, with the new iOS 8, going to apple to get
information may not be much help.
As stated in a previous lecture, even a search warrant may
not be enough for Apple to access a user’s iOS 8 Device.
Due to an updated privacy policy, Apple can not access the
device.

◦ This is according to both the Washington Post, SC Magazine and
the apple’s privacy policy.
◦ http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2014/09/17
/2612af58-3ed2-11e4-b03f-de718edeb92f_story.html
◦ http://www.scmagazine.com/apple-cannot-comply-with-searchwarrants-on-ios-8-devices/article/372410/
◦ http://www.apple.com/privacy/privacy-policy/



Slide 16

In order to get the data requested in the warrant, the
examiners must obtain the information directly form the
device owner.

iOS Security - Encryption






Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
protects against the exploitation of memory
corruption bugs.
Built in Apps use this to ensure that all memory
regions are randomized upon launch.
By randomly arranging the memory address, it
reduces the change of sophisticated activities.
ASLR is part of the enforced security measures
done in the XNU.
◦ XNU is the kernel at the heart of iOS and OS X
systems. It is assumed to be trusted and enforces
security measures.

http://images.apple.com/cn/ipad/business/docs/iOS_Security_Feb14.pdf

Slide 17

iOS Security - Encryption


Data protection allows the device to respond to
events like phone calls.

◦ However, it can also enable a high level of encryption for
sensitive data.
◦ For example, Mail uses data protection by default. Thirdparty apps installed on iOS 7 and iOS 8 automatically get
this protection.





Data protection is constructed and managed by a
hierarchy of keys. They build on the hardware
encryption technologies built into the iOS Device.
It is controlled on a per-file basis. This is done by
assigning each file to a class. Accessibility is then
determined by whether the class keys have been
unlocked.

http://images.apple.com/cn/ipad/business/docs/iOS_Security_Feb14.pdf

Slide 18

iOS Security – Data Protection
When a file on the data partition is created,
Data Protection creates a new key.
 It is then given to the hardware AES engine.
The engine uses the key to encrypt the file
as it is written to the memory.
 When a file is opened, its metadata is
decrypted with the file system key. This
reveals the wrapped per-file key and a notion
on which class protects it. The per-file key is
unwrapped with the classkey, then supplied
to the hardware AES engine, which decyrpts
the file as it is read from flash memory.


http://images.apple.com/cn/ipad/business/docs/iOS_Security_Feb14.pdf
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iOS Security – Data Protection
It is good to know that the metadata of all
files in the file system is encrypted with a
random key. The random Key is created
when iOS is first installed on the device or
the device is wiped by a user.
 The file system key is stored in Effaceable
Storage. This means the key is not used to
maintain the confidentiality of the data. It is
designed to be quickly erased on demand.


◦ Back to the “erase all content and settings”
option!

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1302613-ios-security-guide-sept-2014.html

Slide 20

iOS Security – Data Protection


There are basic classes that a new file is assigned
to. They can be:
◦ Complete Protection

 Key is derived from the user passcode and device UID. After
the device is locked, data is inaccessible until the user enter
the passcode again, or unlocks the device using Touch ID.

◦ Protected Unless Open

 This allows encryption that runs in the background. A good
example would be a mail attachment downloading in the
background.

◦ Protected Until First User Authentication

 Behaves like Complete protection. However, when the device
is locked, the decrypt key is not removed.

◦ No Protection

 Protected only with the UID. Kept in Effaceable Storage.

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1302613-ios-security-guide-sept-2014.html
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iOS Security - Backup


Apple does give the option to use a encrypt
backup option by using a passcode.



Normally, the backup is done through iTunes and
can be found on your computer. On a windows
computer, it can be normally found here:

◦ If the passcode is forgotten, the encryption stays.

◦ \Documents and Settings\ (username) \Application
Data\ Apple Computer\MobileSync\Backup\
 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4946



There are plenty of tools and tips on how to
decrypt an encrypted backup.

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1302613-ios-security-guide-sept-2014.html
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iOS Security - Backup


A known tool is the iPhone Backup Extractor is good
to try and decrypt backups without a passcode.
◦ http://www.iphonebackupextractor.com/blog/2012/aug/15/
decrypting-encrypted-itunes-backups/
 It should be good to note that the free version is limited in it’s
abilities, compared to the bought version.



According to osxdaily.com, there is a way that may
work in trying to find a passcode for the backup.

◦ It can be found by searching through the Keychain access
which is found in /Applications/Utilities/.
◦ From there, you can search for “iphone backup” and you
may find a result in Keychain.
◦ With clicking the “show password’ and enter the Mac
administrator password, you can reveal the lost password.
 http://osxdaily.com/2013/06/26/recover-lost-encrypted-backuppassword-ios/
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Acquisition Methodology
There are a few things to keep in mind
when getting an Acquisition.
 If the device is still active, it is best to
disable the pattern lock, put the device in
airplane mode, and turn off the wifi.


◦ This is if there is no faraday box or faraday
bag available.
◦ Disabling the Wifi and putting the phone in
airplane mode will help avoid the possibility of
a wipe initiation.

iPhone and iOS Forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, Page 111
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Acquisition Methodology








If the device is on and running, leave it on and running.
There could be information, or live evidence, on the device
that could be gone if you shut off the device.
Likewise, if the device is off, leave it off until you reach the lab
where the examination will be done.
Take the model and firmware version from the device. To do
this, examiners would boot the device up in recovery mode.
If a phone does not have to booted in normal mode, why
take the risk of overwriting evidence that can be very
important??
Think of this the same way a computer would be examined.
You wouldn’t start up a computer that possibly has evidence
on it, risking the loss of the evidence.

iPhone and iOS Forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, Page 111

Chapter 9- Week Eight: Jailbreaking
This week’s lecture introduces students to Jailbreaking. When a user jailbreaks
their device, it means that the device allows the user to modify the operating system.
This allows the user to add unofficial application installers on the device to install and
use third party applications. This is one of the reasons a user jailbreaks their device. With
iPhones, jailbreaking may be used so the phone can work with a different carrier.
Jailbreaking also lets the user to manipulate the device. An example of this manipulation
is changing the user interface, or changing the application icons. This information can be
found on idownloadblog.com. 20
Not only does jailbreaking allows users to manipulate the look of the device, but
it can also allow tweaks, modifications and extensions to be applied. An example of a
tweak that can be applied to a jailbroken device is to allow 5 icons on an iPhone instead
20

(iDownloadBlog, 2014)
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of the standard 4. The worst thing that can happen when jailbreaking a device, it can
become unresponsive. There is a fix to this, which is to restore the device’s firmware
back to the stock version. Updating the iOS in a jailbroken device can be a little tricky. If
the update is done, it will overwrite the jailbreak.
A big question students may ask about jailbreaking would be if it was legal or
legal. Jailbreaking became legal in the USA in 201221. However, jailbreaking an
iDevice may void the warranty it has. The warranty on an iDevice becomes void the
minute that the person jailbreaks the device. 22 According to idownloadblog.com, there is
a small work around for this. If the device is reset to factory settings in iTunes, the
device is reset to how the user bought it.
Students are then introduced to the three ways that a device, or iPhone, can be
jailbroken. These ways are untethered, semitethered and tethered. The most desirable
jailbreak is to be untethered. This allows the user to reboot the device with no
consequences. Semitethered does not allow a reboot without some problems with the
applications or tweaks. To get the device to function properly, a tethered boot must be
performed. A tethered is the least desirable of the three. A reboot must be done with a
tethered boot with access to a computer. 23 Firmware is discussed briefly, due to the
firmware slice being replaced with a hacked firmware. The hacked firmware allows third
party applications to be installed on the device. To find the firmware, one can go to
www.iclarified.com. 24
Being that this is a forensics class for iOS devices, acquisition on these types of
devices are discussed. It is stressed to the students these acquisitions need to be very
21

(iDownloadBlog, 2014)
(Apple, 2014)
23
(iDownloadBlog, 2011)
24
(iClarified, 2008)
22

59

careful. Andrew Hoog discusses in his book that there are three steps to acquire the
device: create a wireless network, remotely connect to the device and finally image the
device. 25
The wireless network needs to be static on the forensic workstation, making sure
that the IP address will not change. The examiner then will connect to the device over
secure shell (SSH), which is a known cryptographic network protocol. The device is
finally imaged by using a program called netcat. Netcat will create a tunnel that allows
the connected devices to communicate. By initiating a dd 26 command, the workstations
desktop will create a file with the image on it. It is mentioned that this is one method to
acquire an image, but the risk is still high for loosing data due to the device being
jailbroken.

PowerPoint Presentation for Week Eight
Slide 1
iOS Device Forensics
Jailbreaking
Week 8

Slide 2

Jailbreaking – What is it?
Jailbreaking an iOS device allows the user to
modify the operating system. This means
that the device is modified to run unsigned
code in order to gain access to files that you
could not normally access.
 Jailbreaking also allows unofficial application
installers onto the device. These installers
allow the user to download 3rd party
applications, tweaks and extensions not
available in the App Store.


◦ Example of one of these installers is Cydia.

http://www.idownloadblog.com/jailbreak/

25
26

(Hoog & Strzempka, Acquisitons: Jailbroken Device, 2011)
is a way to copy and convert files and can be accessed through SSH
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Jailbreaking – Why Jailbreak a
device?
The main reason why many jailbreak a
phone is to allow third part applications
to be on the phone.
 Jailbreaking also allows the user to do
things to the device that apple doesn’t
want you to do for different reasons.
 These things can include:


◦ Changing App Icons
◦ Changing the User Interface
http://www.idownloadblog.com/jailbreak/

Slide 4

Jailbreaking – Why jailbreak a
device?


Jailbreaking also allows access to tweaks,
mods and extensions.



These options bring subtle improvements to
the way your iOS device operates.

◦ These are not considered applications.

◦ Example: You can do a tweak that allows you to
have 5 icons on the iPhone instead of the default
4.



Another big reason that many jailbreak an
iPhone is to allow it to work with a different
carrier.

http://www.idownloadblog.com/jailbreak/

Slide 5

Jailbreaking – Legal or Illegal?


Jailbreaking is LEGAL.
◦ At least in the USA.

Legal since 2010
 Good News!!


◦ Even if you don’t live in the US, there is a slim
chance that Apple would sue because a user
jailbroke their device. It hasn’t happened yet!

http://www.idownloadblog.com/jailbreak/

Slide 6

Jailbreaking – for iPhones: Warranty
of device


For phone providers, does Jailbreaking a
device Void the Warranty?



If a user goes to an Apple store and show
the jailbroken device to an employee, you
won’t be able to receive customer
support. Why? The warranty became void
the minute the device was jailbroke.

◦ Yes and No.

http://www.idownloadblog.com/jailbreak/

61

Slide 7

Jailbreaking – for iPhones: Warranty
of device


Apple does acknowledge that the US made
Jailbreaking Legal. However, that doesn’t
mean that Apple has to allow jailbreaking in
its customer agreement.



There is a work around…

◦ http://support.apple.com/kb/ht3743

◦ If the user restores the device to factory settings
in iTunes, it will return the device the user
received it when they first bought it.
◦ Apple is usually not able to tell that the device
was jailbroken, and will provide support.

http://www.idownloadblog.com/jailbreak/

Slide 8

Jailbreaking – Worst Case Scenario
In the early days of jailbreaking, it was
possible to turn your device into a brick.
Now a days, not as likely.
 The worst thing that can happen is that it
can get stuck and become unresponsive.


◦ To fix this if it happens, use restore the
device’s firmware back to the stock version.

http://www.idownloadblog.com/jailbreak/

Slide 9

Jailbreaking – Updating iOS


If the user decides to update the iOS on a
jailbroken device, it will overwrite the
jailbreak and restore the device to it’s
factory settings.
◦ Pain for those who rely on jailbreak apps and
tweaks.

http://www.idownloadblog.com/jailbreak/

Slide 10

Jailbreaking – Types of Jailbreaking


Three ways to jailbreak an iPhone
◦ Untethered

 This is the most desirable jailbreak to have. This allows
the user to jailbreak the device, run Cydia apps and
tweaks, and reboot your device with no consequences.

◦ SemiTethered

 You can reboot your device, but has consequences.
After the reboot, the user may be unable to run any
Cydia jailbreak apps. In order get functionality back,
users have to perform a tethered boot.

◦ Tethered

 Least desirable. Cannot reboot your device without
doing a tethered boot, which means you need access to
a computer.

http://www.idownloadblog.com/2011/10/22/untethered-jailbreak-vs-tethered-jailbreak-vs-semitetheredjailbreak/
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Jailbreaking – Types of Jailbreak


The following link gives a video explaining
the types of jailbreaking that can happen:
◦ http://www.idownloadblog.com/2011/10/22/u
ntethered-jailbreak-vs-tethered-jailbreak-vssemitethered-jailbreak/

Slide 12

Firmware Identification and
Acquisition
Firmware Identification can be found on
the device’s settings.
 By going to settings and general, you can
find basic information in the about section
that includes the Firmware baseband.
 With a jailbroken device, the Apple’s
firmware (slice 1) is replaced with custom
(hacked) firmware.


http://www.iclarified.com/entry/?enid=2543

Slide 13

Firmware Identification and
Acquisition


When doing an acquisition on a jailbroken
device, be careful! Acquiring the device does
modify the user partition. This should be
done as a last resort.
◦ This is because potential evidence could be
overwritten.



There are steps to physically acquire the
jailbroken device:
◦ Create a wireless network
◦ Remotely connect to device
◦ Image device

http://www.iclarified.com/entry/?enid=2543
iPhone and iOS Forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, 129

Slide 14

Firmware Identification and
Acquisition


Create a wireless network
◦ The forensic workstation that the examiner is
using need to have a wireless network
created so the device can be remotely
connected.
◦ The IP address must be static
 Static meaning unchanging.

iPhone and iOS Forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, 129
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Firmware Identification and
Acquisition


Remotely Connect to Device
◦ The device can be connected over SSH.
 SSH is short for Secure Shell, which is a
cryptographic network protocal
 If SSH does not work, it is likely SSH is not installed
on the source packages suggested by the
jailbreaking site. The source packages instructs the
user how to gain root access.

◦ There are ways to get the SSH to the device.

iPhone and iOS Forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, 130
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Firmware Identification and
Acquisition


Image Device

◦ There is a program called netcat that can help
with the imaging.
◦ Netcat creates a tunnel that allows two devices
to communicate and transfer files back and forth
over a specific port.
 The workstation at one end and the device on the other.

◦ After initiation the dd command, a file will be
created on the desktop of the workstation that
will increase in size as the acquisition occurs. An
examiner can then look at this file once the
acquisition is complete.
iPhone and iOS Forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, 132
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Firmware Identification and
Acquisition
The book goes into depth about this
process starting on page 129.
 This is just one way to gain an acquisition,
but the risks of gaining the image of a
jailbroken device is the same.


Chapter 10 – Week Nine: Physical Acquisition
Week nine starts off with non-forensically sound methods for physical
acquisitions. Jailbreaking, which was discussed in the previous week’s presentation, is
considered a non-forensically sound method. This is because the examiners can tamper
with the user data.
Secure Shell (SSH), dd and netcat are considered non-forensically sound as well.
These methods were discussed in the previous week as well. SSH allows examiners to
64

access the files stored on the device, making this method non-forensically sound. 27 In
UNIX, dd is a way to copy and convert files and can be accessed through SSH. One has
to be careful when using dd because if you access the wrong file, the device can be
damaged.

28

This makes it non-forensically sound as well. Netcat is non-forensically

sound due to communicating over a port that could be secure or unsecure.
There are forensically sound methods for doing an acquisition. One well known
method is the Zdziarski method. Jonathon Zdziarski was a former researcher for
McAfee, Inc. 29. The Zdziarski method is not so much an application, but a toolkit that
allows acquisitions to occur. What this method does is allows the examiner to execute a
bit-by-bit copy of the device’s user partition. The partition gained, which is read-only,
stays isolated from the partition containing the users data. Because the user’s data isn’t
violated, the method is sound.
This method may seem familiar to the jailbreaking method. There are
differences between the two. The Zdziarski method caters more to forensic recovery. It
deals with read-only partitions on the device. Jailbreaking, however, focuses more on
hacking into the device. Hacking into the device might interfere with the user’s data,
which is not good.
Another forensically sound method that is mentioned is Lantern Lite/Imager. 30 31
This is a free software that uses bootloader from the jailbreak took redsn0w. This
software will then obtain a physical image of an iPhone 4. Sadly, this tool is known for
its work with iPhone 4, and not with any other device. This is forensically sound because

27

(Lee, 2011)
(Rubin, MacKenzie, & Kemp, 2010)
29
(Hoog & Strzempka, Acquisitions: Zdziarski Technique, 2011)
30
(Whitfield, 2012)
31
(Cavanaugh, 2012)
28
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it takes advantage of DFU mode. It is mentioned that it can be compared to software that
is used by police, Katana Lantern.

PowerPoint Presentation for Week Nine
Slide 1
iOS Device Forensics
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Week 9
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Non-Forensically Sound Methods Jailbreaking
As discussed last week, Jailbreaking
phones is a non-forensically sound
method.
 This is not a forensically sound method
because when jailbreaking the device, you
can tamper with the user data.


◦ This will be discussed more when we talk
about the Zdzarski method.

Slide 3

Non-Forensically Sound Methods SSH
SSH can be placed on a device after the
device has been jailbroken, as talked about
last week.
 SSH will allow the device to be networked
onto the computer, using a secure channel.
 It allows you access to the phone’s files,
which makes it non-forensically sound due
to accessing the files.


◦ Mess with the wrong file, you can ruin your
device and make it inoperable.
http://www.idownloadblog.com/2011/03/14/how-to-ssh-into-your-iphone/

Slide 4

Non-Forensically Sound Methods dd
dd in Unix is to copy and convert a file.
You can access dd through the SSH.
 This goes back to what was stated a few
slides back. If you use dd on a wrong file,
seeing how the files can be accessed, you
can damage your device.



◦ Examiners that use this method need to be
very careful.
http://linux.die.net/man/1/dd
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Non-Forensically Sound Methods –
Netcat


Netcat creates a tunnel that allows two
devices to communicate and transfer files
back and forth over a specific port.

◦ The workstation at one end and the device on
the other.



After initiation the dd command, a file will
be created on the desktop of the
workstation that will increase in size as the
acquisition occurs. An examiner can then
look at this file once the acquisition is
complete.

http://netcat.sourceforge.net/

Slide 6

Forensically-Sound Methods –
Zdziarski Method
This method was created by Jonathan
Zdziarksi, who was a former research
scientist for McAfee, inc.
 Zdziarski understood that “cell phones
have a comparatively limited operating
system, cannot boot into a forensic
environment, and possess a typically
nonremoveable memory. “


◦ iPhone and iOS Forensics – Andrew Hoog &
Katie Strzempka

iPhone and iOS Forensics by Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, 124-127

Slide 7

Forensically-Sound Methods –
Zdziarski Method
Zdziarksi’s method allows the examiner to
perform a bit-by-bit copy of the iDevice’s
user partition. It can then provide an MD5
sum to prove that the copy is authentic.
 “This ability does not exist in the standard
iPhone operating system and requires
modification of a read-only system partition
to allow for this technique.”


◦ iPhone and iOS Forensics by Andrew Hoog and
Katie Strzempka
iPhone and iOS Forensics by Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, 124-127

Slide 8

Forensically-Sound Methods –
Zdziarski Method
The partition copied, however, remains
completely isolated from the partition
containing user data. It is meant to stay in
a factory state.
 This is good and makes the method
forensically sound. Why?


◦ It doesn’t violate user data while performing
necessary payload installation.

iPhone and iOS Forensics by Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, 124-127
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Forensically-Sound Methods –
Zdziarski Method
It is good to know that this technique
modifies only the system partition, and
not the user partition.
 Know that during the normal operation
of the device, the system partition stays in
the factory state. It is only modified when
a firmware update occurs.


iPhone and iOS Forensics by Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, 124-127
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Forensically-Sound Methods –
Zdziarski Method


There are differences between
Jailbreaking and the Zdziarksi Method.
◦ Jailbreaking deals more with hacking into the
device, which means that it will tamper with
the user data.
◦ Zdziarski is more tailored to forensic
recovery. This means that is operates only on
read-only system partitions.

iPhone and iOS Forensics by Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, 124-127
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Forensically-Sound Methods –
Zdziarski Method
Instead of restoring the device, a bundle
installs a recovery payload. This is put on
the device’s read-only system partition.
 This lets the examiner SSH access to the
device. This is done by bypassing any pass
code security the device has.


Forensically-Sound Methods – Zdziarski Method, 124-127
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Forensically-Sound Methods –
Zdziarski Method


Remember: the Zdziarski Method is not an
application that can be used. It is toolkit that allows
acquisitions.



You can get the toolkit at iPhoneinsecurity.com. The
book will discuss in more depth on how to use the
toolkit.



The website will also provide documentation to help
with the examination.
For reports, a raw dd image is produced. It can then
be imported into forensic tools or be analyzed by a
command line.

◦ The acquisitions are bit-by-bit copies (dd image)

◦ Tried to get to iPhoneinsecurity.com, but the website
doesn’t seem to exist.



Forensically-Sound Methods – Zdziarski Method, 124-127
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Slide 13

Forensically-Sound Methods –
Lantern Lite/Imager
Lantern Lite Imager is a free software.
It uses the bootloader from the jailbreak
tool redsn0w. It then obtains a full
physcial image of an iphone 4.
 Lantern Lite takes advantage of being able
to going into DFU, which makes it
Forensically-Sound.
 It can be compared to Katana Lantern,
which is used by Police Officials.



https://forensic4cast.com/2012/03/lantern-lite-imager/
http://www.appleexaminer.com/iPhoneiPad/LanternLite/LanternLite.html

Chapter 11 – Week Ten: Advanced iOS Security
In week ten, the topic for the presentation is advanced iOS security and advanced
logical acquisitions. The first thing covered in this area is file_relay, which deals with
backdoors in iOS. Zdziarski had done research on this, which can be found in his own
presentation found on his website 32. He found that file_relay helps examiners bypass the
backup encryption found on iTunes. Zdziarski believes that this is the biggest area of
intelligence on the device. File_Relay can be used to gain access to personal data onteh
device. This data can be email and Facebook accounts, as well as GPS logs, Photos and
User Databases. User databases can be very useful because it contains short message
service (SMS) database, which are also text messages, calendars and the address book.
Next in advanced logical acquisitions is Pairing Authentication, which uses
lockdownd. Lockdownd is just a daemon that provides system information to clients. To
understand this, one has to understand pairing. Pairing happens when you give
permission for a device to access the other device. For example, whenever a person plugs
their iDevice into a computer, the user allows the computer to access the device. This is
a pairing. According to Zdziarski, Juice Jacking can be used to establish a pairing. Juice
Jacking, according to howtogeek.com, Juice Jacking is “leveraging the USB data/power

32

(Zdziarski, 2014)
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cable to illegitimately access the phone’s data and/or inject malicious code onto the
device.” 33 By the definition provided, this can be a bad thing.
This can also bypass the backup encryption. Another note about Pairing
Authentication to make is that all of the lockdownd protocols have been documented in
the libimobiledevice project 34. Libimobiledevice is a cross-platform softare protocol
library. It provides tools to communicate with iOS devices. The downside to this,
however, is that its services have not been looked at since its creation in 2009.
Packet sniffers are on iDevices, and are active on every iOS device, under
com.apple.mobile.pcapd 35. Sadly, there is no indicator to the user that this is running.
The big question, then, is why are packet sniffers on iOS Devices? There are many
theories as to why they are present. One such theory is so that developers are testing their
applications. Zdziarski slightly debunks this because the sniffers are enabled on devices
on non-developer mode. Apple’s reasoning for having packet sniffers on the device is to
help with troubleshooting and diagnosing issues with applications. With the new iOS 8,
this ability is restricted to USB interface. Even through there is some controversy on this,
it is still useful to know for examiners, so they could use packet sniffers to their
advantage.
The last thing that advanced logical acquisition talks about is house_arrest. Apple
states that house_arrest is used by iTunes to transfer documents to and from the device. 36
Zdziarksi, however, believes that it is used to copy documents to and from third party
application. This allows access to the preference folders. The preference folders can be

33

(Fitzpatrick, 2013)
(LibiMobileDevice, 2009)
35
(Apple, 2014)
36
(Apple, 2014)
34
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useful because it provides storage for Facebook and photos. Not only this, but
house_arrest can assist in recovering deleted messages.
Theories as to why these methods exist are discussed in the end of the
presentation, as well as Zdziarski explaining why they are not viable. For instance, a
theory is that it is used for developers for debugging. Zdziarski states that developers do
not need to bypass backup encryption and do not need to access sensitive content in order
to debug. 37

PowerPoint Presentation for Week Ten
Slide 1
iOS Device Forensics
Advanced iOS Security
Week 10

Slide 2

Advanced Logical Acquisition –
File_relay


Are there backdoors in iOS?
◦ Or Better yet, is there a way to bypass iTunes
backup encryption?
◦ Zdziarski did research on how this can be
done.
 http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_P
oints_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf

◦ He found that file_relay bypasses the backup
encryption.

37

(Zdziarski, 2014)
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Slide 3

Advanced Logical Acquisition –
File_Relay


The full name to find the file_relay is the
following:
◦ Com.apple.mobile.file_relay

According to Zdziarski, this is the biggest
forensic trove of intelligence on the device.
 Where can you find it?


◦ /usr/libexec/mobile_file_relay


The file_relay transmits large amount of raw
file data. It is in a compressed cpio archive.

http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf

Slide 4

Advanced Logical Acquisition – File
Relay


File_Relay can be used to give very personal
data that is on the device. This can include:
◦
◦
◦
◦

Email accounts
Facebook accounts
GPS logs
HFSMeta

 This is a sparse image of the file system on the device.
This can include timestamps, filenames, sizes, and
creation dates of all files.

◦ Photos
◦ UserDatabases

 This can include the SMS database, calendar, address
book, etc.

http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf

Slide 5

Advanced Logical Acquisition –
Pairing Authentication


To access Undocumented Services,
examiners can go through lockdownd,
which is what is required in pairing
authentication.

◦ Pairing is a trusted relationship with another
device. A computer is granted permission to
access the device.
◦ Whenever you plug in your iPhone into a
computer, you are allowing the computer
access to the device, allowing a pairing to
happen.

http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/

http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf

Slide 6

Advanced Logical Acquisition –
Pairing Authentication


According to Zdziarski, Juice Jacking can be used to
establish pairing, and that can be a bad thing. So what
is juice jacking?
◦ For the device, the power supply and the data pass over
the same cable. This means that whatever cable you use
to charge your device, can also be the same cable that
syncs your data.
◦ This can sometimes allow a user to gain access your
device while charging.
◦ The definition provided by howtogeek.com is the
following:

 “leveraging the USB data/power cable to illegitimately access the
phone’s data and/or inject malicious code onto the device is
known as juice jacking.”

 http://www.howtogeek.com/166497/htg-explains-what-is-juice-jacking-andhow-worried-should-you-be/

http://www.howtogeek.com/166497/htg-explains-what-is-juice-jacking-and-how-worried-should-you-be/
http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf
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Slide 7

Advanced Logical Acquisition –
Pairing Authentication



This method also bypasses backup encryption and
can be accessed through USB and wireless.
Almost all lockdownd protocols have been
documented in the libimobiledevice project.
◦ Libimobiledevice is a cross-platform software
protocol library which provides tools to
communicate with iOS devices, according to their
website.
◦ The website that has some information about the
project can be found at libimobiledevice.org and has
been around since 2009.

 A note to make would be that many of these services haven’t
been looked at since 2009, according to Zdziarski.
http://www.libimobiledevice.org/
http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf

Slide 8

Advanced Logical Acquisition –
Packet Sniffers on device?


Com.apple.pcapd immediately starts
libpcap on devices. This does not require
developer mode and is active on every
iOS device.
◦ Libpcap is a implemented pcap (packet
capture) used by Unix-like systems.



There is no visual indication to the user
that pack sniffer is running on the device.

http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pcap

Slide 9

Advanced Logical Acquisition –
Packet Sniffers on device?


So why are there packet sniffers running
on iOS Devices?
◦ A popular theory is that developers are
testing their applications.

 However, Zdziarski does mention that the sniffers
are enabled on non-devleoper mode devices as well.

◦ Zdziarski does not know exactly why packet
sniffers are on devices, and there are many
theories as to why they are there.
◦ Knowing this, however, can be useful for
examiners during cases.
http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf

http://news.yahoo.com/iphone-may-rigged-spy183943399.html;_ylt=A0LEVyuXPE1UzLQAGYpXNyoA;_ylu=X3oDMTEzMWp0Z3ZhBHNlYwNzcgRwb3MDNgRjb2xvA2JmMQR2dGlkA1ZJUDUwMl8x

Slide 10

Advanced Logical Acquisition –
Packet Sniffers on device?


According to apple,
com.apple.mobile.pcapd, this is useful for
troubleshooting and diagnosing issues
with apps on the device. It also helps
with VPN connections.
◦ In iOS 8, it’s ability is restricted to USB
inferface and can’t be used over wireless.

http://support.apple.com/kb/HT6331
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Slide 11

Advanced Logical Acquisition –
house_arrest
According to apple,
com.apple.mobile.house_arrest is used by
iTunes to transfer documents to and from
the device. This can be for apps that
support this feature.
 According to Zdziarski…


◦ House_arrest was used to copy documents
from and to third party applications.
◦ It doesn’t permit the copies to happen
through the GUI.

http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf

http://support.apple.com/kb/HT6331

Slide 12

Advanced Logical Acquisition –
house_arrest
These services allow access to the
Library, Caches, Cookies and Preferences
folders.
 The preference folders are important to
note. Why?


◦ The folders provided sensitive account
storage. This can include:
 Facebook Caches
 Photos
 Twitter

http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf

Slide 13

Advanced Logical Acquisition –
house_arrest


Zdzarski did a good example of how
house_arrest can be used to gain
information on a device.

◦ With Twitter, house_arrest can be able to see
the most recent timeline and recent photos
from a stream.
◦ Also, house_arrest allows access to the
private message database as well as
recovering deleted messages.
◦ Provides a screenshot of the last use of
Twitter.

http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf

Slide 14

Advanced Logical Acquisition


There are many theories as to why these
methods are available, but Zdzarski has
seemingly proven that these theories are
not correct.
◦ You can see the theories on the link provided.
 http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_P
oints_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf
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Slide 15

Advanced Logical Acquisition


Some of these theories include and proven wrong
by Zdzarski:
◦ iTunes or Xcode use them? – No

 iTunes respects the backup encryption. Also, iTunes only uses
house_arrest to access documents, and does not use file relay
or pcap.

◦ Used for Genius Bar or Apple Support? – No
 Data is too raw a format, which also can’t be put back on the
phone. Also, the data is to personal for tech support.

◦ Used for Developers for Debugging? – No
 Developer tools live on the developers image. They are only
available with developer mode is being used. Also, developers
don’t need to bypass backup encryption and does not need to
access the sensitive content.
http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf

Chapter 12 – Week Eleven: Forensic Reporting and Presentation
The last week of presentations for students covers Forensic Reporting and
Presentation. This is important because examiners need to know how to properly
document their findings in cases, as well as presenting said findings to others or in court.
A forensic report is a report of what tools were used during the investigation, as well as
what was found. The report can go to supervisors, clients, attorneys or the Judge and
Jury.
As stated before, investigators or examiners should put what steps were taken to
gain the evidence. It is important to note the order in which they handled the evidence.
This creates a timeline that the evidence has gone through, which can help assist with
showing a chain of custody. 38
There are many websites that can help one create and see a forensic report.
Another important thing to do when reporting is to take notes of what is done. This can
include screenshots, bookmarking evidence or making notes through a digital recorder or
hand writing them. 39 Reports need to be detailed to show how one got the data.

38
39

(Christly)
(Garcia, 2010)
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As important forensic reporting is, communicating properly with others about the
evidence is equally important. According to Shayne Sherman in his document A digital
forensic practitioner’s guide to giving evidence in a court of law, the use of PowerPoints
and charts are very useful. What an examiner needs to remember is that not everyone
may know technical terms, and using PowerPoints and charts can help others understand
the information.
The week’s presentation concludes with looking into what makes iOS analysis
‘forensic’. For this, the lecture refers back to week one’s look into technical analysis and
forensic examinations. One must remember that technical analysis is how the examiner
retrieved the evidence where a forensic examination is how one interprets the evidence to
determine innocence or guilt.

PowerPoint Presentation for Week Eleven
Slide 1
iOS Device Forensics
Forensic Reporting and Presentation
Week 11

Slide 2

Forensic Reporting





A forensic report is used for many purposes.
However, the reports are mainly used to show
proof of what or what wasn’t found. In the case
of this class, it would be an iDevice.
A Forensic Report also is a way to present
findings in a manner that other can understand.
These reports can go to a number of people:
◦
◦
◦
◦

Supervisors
Client
Attorney
Judge / Jury
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Slide 3

Forensic Reporting


The investigator should put everything
that he or she did to process the
evidence. The notes should be in
chronological order to establish a timeline
that the evidence went through.
◦ Note that this should include the time zone
that the evidence was processed in. This will
help verify the time stamped items.



The report needs to show what tools
(Software and Hardware) were used.

http://www.eteraconsulting.com/12/07/forensic-reporting-how-it-works-and-why-it-important

Slide 4

Forensic Reporting


What you should do for good reporting

◦ Takes Notes! Some tips for good note taking:





Screenshots
Bookmarking evidence
Use Built-in logging or reporting options
Use of a digital recorder vs hand written notes

◦ Your report should include:






Case Summary
Forensic Acquisition & Exam Preparation
Findings
Report (forensic analysis)
Conclusion

http://digital-forensics.sans.org/blog/2010/08/19/digital-forensics-reporting-casenotes-walkthroughreview/

Slide 5

Forensic Reporting


It is very important to show the “Chain of
Custody” in the report.
◦ Chain of Custody - The movement and location
of physical evidence from the time it is obtained
until the time it is presented in court.
 http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/chain+of+custody

http://www.eteraconsulting.com/12/07/forensic-reporting-how-it-works-and-why-it-important

Slide 6

Forensic Reporting


A good site to help with writing a
Forensic Report:
◦ http://digitalforensics.sans.org/blog/2010/08/25/introreport-writing-digital-forensics/
◦ http://digitalforensics.sans.org/blog/2013/02/26/reportwriting-digital-forensics-part-ii
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Slide 7

Communication Strategies
You have to remember that the reader of
the report may not know all the technical
terms that an examiner would know.
 Be careful not to over simplify the ability
of the jury to understand the evidence.
 The use of PowerPoints and Charts help
with understanding the material.


 A Digital Forensic Practitioner’s Guide to giving
evidence in a court of law, Sherman
http://cryptome.org/2014/03/forensic-evidence-in-court.pdf

Slide 8

What makes iOS Analysis ‘forensic’?


Lets think back on Technical Analysis vs
‘Forensic’ examination back in week one.
◦ Technical Analysis is used to authenticate data
through explanation of the technical features
of data and future usage.
◦ A ‘Forensic’ Examination attempts to
understand the evidence that is found from
the acquisitions.

Slide 9

What makes iOS Analysis ‘forensic’?


For technical Analysis, this is how the
examiner would explain how the evidence
was retrieved.
◦ REMEMBER! The jury does not know a lot of
the technical terms that examiners do.
However, try to explain what you did so the
jury can better understand how the examiner
got to that conclusion.

Slide 10

What makes iOS Analysis ‘forensic’?


A forensic examination, as stated in week
1, is more then just the technical data that
is found.
◦ It is the ability to understand what the
evidence means in terms of the case. It allows
the examiner to show whether or not the
evidence proves guilt or innocence.
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Slide 11

Reminder!


For Graduate Students, next week starts
the time to turn in your paper.
◦ You have until the last day of class, but you
also have the option to turn it in early.



Next week we will discuss the final
project.

Chapter 13 – Weeks Twelve through Fifteen: The Final Project
The remaining time for the semester will be spent on the student’s working on a
project using what they have learned in the class. The first phase of the project is giving
the students a backup of a device containing evidence of a guilty party. The students then
are encouraged to work either individually or in groups to retrieve the evidence. By the
end of week fourteen, students or groups will turn in a report of their findings based on
the backup that was provided. Week fifteen will be reserved for the student or group to
present the project to others in a mock trail setting. Student will be encouraged to dress
professionally, as if they were presenting to a real trial.

The Backup Provided for Students
The backup that was prepared contains two fake parties, Wayne Tarsle and Mark
Bytes. Emails were set up for the each party, as well as an apple ID for each. Emails, as
well as iMessages, were exchanged between the two fake individuals, setting up a
scenario where Wayne sends evidence to Mark in exchange for money. The evidence in
question was two plain sheets of paper with “Evidence #1” and “Evidence #2” written on
them. The pictures of these sheets of paper were then sent to each respective email
address. This was all done on an Apple iPhone 4s.
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Chapter 14 – Conclusion
At the end of the semester, students should have a basic understanding of
iOS device forensics, as well as some key concepts in this field. The field is
constantly growing and changing with each new update and release that iOS has.
This makes it difficult to find accurate information on this subject, especially with
a forensic standpoint. Thankfully, there are plenty of internet sources, like the
Apple Developer Library, that can have this information. This also shows that
having developing a class for interested individuals can be beneficial as well.
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